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ABSTRACT 
 A balance-of-power argument that completely discounts the role played by the 
United States has been employed in a recent attempt to explain both the origins of 
European integration and the Continent’s recent difficulties. This thesis sets out to rebut 
these notions through an examination of the historical record. Such an examination 
makes it clear that France and West Germany’s reasons for pursuing the integration of 
Western Europe were grounded in these states’ relationships with one another within the 
postwar context, not in their fear of Soviet aggression. France, after all, was seeking to 
rebuild itself and hold down the Germans after the war, while West Germany was 
seeking to regain its sovereignty. Further, it is clear from the historical record that the 
role played by the United States in the earliest iterations of postwar European integration 
was critical and should not be discounted.  
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One 
Introduction 
While regional integration has become a very important part of the modern world 
since the end of World War II, recent financial difficulties in Europe have called the 
persistence of regional integration into question. Indeed, the European debt crisis has 
caused such uncertainty within the eurozone that some observers question whether the 
European Union will continue to enjoy the support of the states that created it. Gaining a 
proper understanding of the conditions that made early European integrative efforts 
successful is therefore important, as it is this understanding which will make a more 
accurate prediction regarding the future of regional integration on the Continent possible. 
Such an understanding may also assist in the creation of a general theory of regional 
integration, as European integration is often considered to be the most advanced and, 
therefore, perhaps the most instructive example of this phenomenon.  
In order to effectively pursue such an understanding, one must go all the way 
back to the critical early years of European integration and examine the reasons why the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) – the institution which would prove to be 
the earliest forerunner of the modern-day European Union – was created. The historical 
record indicates that this is a complicated story. The reasons behind the pursuit of 
integration in the years following World War II reflect the varying interests of the states 
involved, making it clear that there was not one simple, overarching rationale that made
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integration in Europe appealing to all. Additionally, the historical record demonstrates 
that the efforts of the United States were critical to the formation of the ECSC, and that 
without its assistance to the Continent and encouragement of the ECSC concept, regional 
integration likely would not have enjoyed the success that it did. The role played by the 
U.S. was so crucial, in fact, that European integration may never have occurred at all 
apart from American efforts. 
This complex, multi-causal explanation of European integration in the postwar era 
flies in the face of recent scholarship. Sebastian Rosato, in “Europe’s Troubles: Power 
Politics and the State of the European Project,”1 presents an altogether different narrative 
regarding the formation of the earliest iteration of the modern-day European Union. 
Rosato asserts that the Europeans’ desire to seek regional integration was the result of a 
simple balance-of-power calculation based on their fear of the Soviet Union.
2
  Indeed, he 
argues that the decisions made by France and West Germany to pursue economic 
integration via the ECSC were driven by “balance of power thinking,”3 and that the 
overwhelming comparative strength of the Soviet Union in the early years of the Cold 
War was the sole reason why these and four other states decided to pursue the unification 
of Western Europe.
4
  He posits further that, based on this understanding of the origins of 
European integration, it makes sense that the states of Europe currently “have no 
                                                          
1
 Sebastian Rosato, “Europe’s Troubles: Power Politics and the State of the European Project,” 
International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), 45-86. 
 
2
 ibid., 48. 
 
3
 ibid., 60. 
 
4
 ibid., 53-54. 
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compelling reason to preserve their economic community.”5 The need to balance the 
powerful Soviet Union disappeared with that state’s demise in 1991, so the impetus to 
pursue and sustain integrative efforts in Europe has also disappeared. In Rosato’s view, 
then, it should come as no surprise that the economic downturn of recent years has put 
stress on the institutions of Europe and caused some states to pursue self-serving policies 
that may not be beneficial for Europe as a whole.
6
 Europe, according to Rosato, is 
“fraying.”7 
The historical record, however, tells a different story. In order to truly grasp the 
genesis of European integration, one must begin with World War II. The wholesale 
destruction of Western Europe that resulted from this terrible war ultimately provided 
much of the impetus for the pursuit of regional integration in Europe, with a number of 
goals held by European policy elites stemming directly from this conflict. The French, for 
their part, placed a great deal of emphasis on rebuilding their country in the immediate 
postwar period, an effort that required access to a very large amount of natural resources. 
The Ruhr – a region which, as defined by the French in October 1945, included the 
entirety of the coalfield east of the Rhine – was seen as an important supplier of these 
resources. As a result, French policy elites sought to internationalize this portion of 
Germany, an action which would allow them unfettered access to the enormously 
valuable coke and coal that were mined there.
8
 This desire to pursue internationalization 
                                                          
5
 ibid., 48. 
 
6
 ibid., 72-77. 
 
7
 ibid., 72. 
 
 
 
4 
 
eventually led to a French realization of the necessity and desirability of placing all of the 
coal and steel resources of Western Europe under supranational control,
9
 thereby laying 
the foundation for the creation of the ECSC. The fear of a resurgent Germany, however, 
also entered very prominently into the calculations of French policy elites as they 
considered the creation of an integrated Western Europe. By folding the tremendous coal 
and steel resources of West Germany into a larger European supranational framework, 
the French believed that they might be able to prevent a reindustrialized Germany from 
initiating yet another destructive war.
10
 The French also believed that tying West 
Germany into Western supranational institutions would prevent the Germans from 
turning their backs on the West and allying themselves with the Soviet Union.
11
 In sum, 
the French were attempting to gain some degree of control over the Germans through the 
creation of the ECSC. While there is a place for the USSR in this narrative, it is, in fact, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8
 Alan Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51 (Berkeley, California: University of 
California Press, 1984), 127-128. 
Craig Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2003), 39, 45. 
Irwin Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), 65. 
F. Roy Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe, 1945-1967 (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1968), 15. 
Ernst Van Der Beugel, From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership (New York: Elsevier Publishing 
Company, 1966), 30. 
 
9
 Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1999), 76.  
John Gillingham, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), 169-170. 
Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51, 165-166. 
Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe, 51, 63. 
 
10
 Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 74-76 
Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe, 44. 
Gillingham, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955, 157. 
John Gillingham, European Integration, 1950-2003: Superstate or New Market Economy? (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 22. 
 
11
 Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 74-76. 
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after the French had already decided upon and proposed the Schuman Plan, as it was after 
the Communist incursion into South Korea that the potential threat posed by the USSR 
became solidified in the minds of the French. This means, of course, that a fear of the 
Soviet Union had much more to do with the ECSC’s eventual success than its initiation. 
 West German policy elites, on the other hand, sought above all else to end the 
occupation of their defeated country by the victorious Allies and return to some level of 
normalcy. Their ultimate goal, of course, was for West Germany to be seen as and treated 
like an equal in the international community, something that was impossible as long as 
the country was being run by foreign powers. The first step toward the realization of this 
goal was the accession of West Germany to the Council of Europe. This would only be 
possible, however, if a favorable outcome could be had vis-à-vis the Saar, which had 
essentially been handed over to France by the Allies in the wake of World War II.
12
 West 
Germany was still concerned about its own economic recovery after the war, after all, 
meaning it desired to maintain access to Western Europe’s critical natural resources. The 
supranational ECSC provided a solution to this problem. The ECSC also became the 
method by which the Ruhr question would be answered in a manner that satisfied the 
Germans,
13
 as it provided a means for them to gain something from the 
internationalization of the Ruhr
14
 while simultaneously assuaging the fears of their 
neighbors. The ECSC also provided a way for the German government to eradicate the 
excessive nationalism that was reestablishing itself in West Germany in the late 1940s as 
                                                          
12
 Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51, 140. 
 
13
 Gillingham, European Integration, 1950-2003: Superstate or New Market Economy?, 24-26. 
 
14
 Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 76. 
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a result of the Saar and Ruhr conflicts. The French and the Germans, then, had what seem 
to be very different motivations for pursuing the integration of their continent, meaning 
the reasons why the Europeans decided to pursue integration after World War II are 
clearly much more complicated than Rosato indicates.  
Rosato also presents an alternative account with regard to the role played by the 
United States during the early years of European integration. In it, he completely 
discounts the part played by the Western superpower, claiming that “U.S. encouragement 
was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for [European] integration.”15 Again, 
the historical record paints a different picture. The critical importance of the American 
contribution to the success of early European integrative efforts also began with World 
War II. After playing a vital part in the Allied victory over the Axis powers, the United 
States was undeniably the most powerful Western country in the world. As a result, it 
was able to exert a great deal of influence over the affairs of Western Europe. This 
influence largely stemmed from three sources: the United States’ control over occupied 
Germany, the United States’ ability to contribute financially to the reconstruction of the 
countries devastated by World War II, and the United States’ ability to provide security 
for the Continent. American policy elites believed that the revitalization of Germany was 
indeed necessary,
16
 and that it had to occur within a European framework.
17
 When 
combined with a fear of Soviet encroachment upon Western Europe, these beliefs led to 
                                                          
15
Rosato, 78. 
 
16
 Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954, 39, 73. 
 
17
 Van Der Beugel, From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership, 33-34. 
Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954, 73. 
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the creation of the Marshall Plan.
18
 Through this plan, the Americans hoped in some way 
to convince the French, whose acceptance of the Marshall Plan was seen as critical to the 
plan’s success,19 to accept the reconstruction of Germany,20 a vital precondition for the 
creation of a unified Western Europe. The United States also hoped that the Marshall 
Plan would, through the creation of the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation, lay a practical foundation for the integration of Western Europe,
21
 
something which had, again, come to be seen as necessary for a continent that had 
completely torn itself apart over the course of the previous half century. 
 French uneasiness about a reindustrialized Germany presented itself as an 
obstacle to the Americans’ chosen policy of European integration, however.22 The 
horrors of World War II were still vivid in French minds, meaning that fear of Germany 
was still a common sentiment in France.
23
 As a result, a security guarantee from the 
United States against future German aggression became necessary for the French to 
embrace the total reindustrialization of Germany, and this was achieved through the 
                                                          
18
 Van Der Beugel, From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership, 34-36. 
Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954, 73. 
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 ibid., 74. 
Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51, 142. 
Gillingham, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955, 138. 
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 Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954, 74. 
 
21
 Van Der Beugel, From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership, 99-105. 
Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954, 75. 
Gillingham, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955, 133. 
 
22
 Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe, 39. 
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 Timothy Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1981), 158. 
Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51, 501. 
Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe, 1945-1967, 58, 60. 
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creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
24
 The French simply did not want to 
be left alone on the Continent with Germany, and NATO saw to it that they would not be, 
even once the Americans decided to stop occupying the defeated German state. With 
France on board with German reindustrialization and inclusion in a Western European 
framework, the integration of the Continent became possible, meaning American 
involvement as Europe’s peacekeeper was critical.25 
 Additionally, while there were musings about the concept of European integration 
during the interwar period,
26
 it was the Truman administration that actually put forward 
the concrete idea for the integration of Western Europe’s coal and steel industries.27 The 
American acceptance of the potential benefits that came along with the aforementioned 
French preoccupation with the internationalization of the Ruhr
28
 led the Truman 
administration to suggest that the creation of a supranational coal and steel community 
might be a good way to maintain wider European access to the resources of the Ruhr 
without alienating West Germany and forcing it into the open arms of the Soviet Union. 
This basic idea was presented two years later as the Schuman Plan,
29
 the proposal to 
integrate the coal and steel industries of France and West Germany that ultimately led to 
the creation of the ECSC.  
                                                          
24
 Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 159. 
 
25
 ibid., 178-179. 
 
26
 Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe, 43. 
 
27
 Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 76. 
Gillingham, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 169-170. 
 
28
 Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951, 140. 
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 Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 76. 
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 Finally, the Eisenhower administration, picking up the mantle of support for 
European integration from its predecessor, provided critical assistance to the ECSC that 
allowed it to achieve success in the early days of its operation. One of the most important 
manifestations of this assistance came in the form of a large loan from the United States 
government to the embryonic ECSC. This loan was seen as critical by Jean Monnet, as it 
helped the ECSC fund its modernization efforts
30
 while conspicuously reaffirming 
American support for the process of European integration.
31
 Additionally, Monnet 
suggested, and Adenauer supported, the appointment of an official American ambassador 
to the new ECSC. They believed that such a move by the Eisenhower administration 
would further underscore the importance that the United States placed on furthering the 
process of integration in Europe, an important consideration in light of the fact that these 
key European elites saw American support for their integrative efforts as critical to their 
success.
32
 Not only was American support for the unification of Europe an indispensible 
part of getting this process off the ground, but it was also a crucial part of seeing to it that 
it ultimately succeeded. 
Rosato’s narrative in “Europe’s Troubles: Power Politics and the State of the 
European Project” is simply not supported by the historical record. This calls into 
question the entire balance of power-based theory of institutions that he presents, making 
his predictions regarding the future of integration in Europe suspect as a result. Since a 
proper understanding of the history of Europe is an integral part of the creation of any 
                                                          
30
 ibid., 341-342. 
 
31
 Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1993), 45-46. 
 
32
 ibid., 38-40. 
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prediction regarding the future of Europe, this paper, using the current literature on the 
topic of European integration as well as the historical record, will explain the real reasons 
why “the Six” – France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg – signed the 1951 Treaty of Paris and thereby took the first step toward the 
creation of the modern-day EU. France and West Germany will be the focal points of this 
study, as it was these two states that initiated the process of European integration in the 
first place. This paper will also shed light on precisely how important American 
encouragement of and involvement in early European integrationist efforts actually were. 
The aforementioned Truman and Eisenhower administrations, which were critical to both 
the creation and the subsequent success of the fragile early iterations of European 
integration, will be examined as this paper seeks to understand the role played by the 
Americans in early Continental integrationist efforts.  
 What will become clear throughout is that the motivations held by the Europeans 
went far beyond a simple wish to balance the Soviet Union, reflecting instead each 
individual state’s respective desires. These desires reflected their relationships with each 
other within the postwar context far more than they reflected their relationships with the 
USSR, and that is perhaps the key to gaining an accurate understanding of the reasons 
why the Europeans decided to seek integration. Additionally, the crucial role played by 
the United States will be made plain. Put simply, the United States’ financial and military 
might put it in the position to encourage the Europeans to pursue integration by putting 
pressure on them to do so while providing the environment within which integration 
became possible. This encouragement was essential, and European integration simply 
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would not have happened the way it did without it. The Truman administration did, after 
all, also provide the Europeans with a concrete way to begin the process of integration, 
something which had been lacking when Europeans had pondered integration before. 
Without World War II, then, it seems that European integration may never have 
happened, as it very clearly set the stage for the United States to facilitate an experiment 
in Continental supranationality. 
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Two 
 
European Motivations 
 
 When one seeks to understand and explain the earliest years of Continental 
integration, one must look first and foremost to World War II. In the wake of the 
horrifying destruction that occurred in Western Europe during that war, the statesmen of 
both France and, after its creation, West Germany had many national goals that they 
wished to accomplish. For the French, the reconstruction of their country was paramount, 
while the West Germans sought above all else to regain the sovereignty that they had lost 
as a result of the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany and the occupation of their 
state. While these aims clearly grew out of the situations that these states found 
themselves in as a result of the war, other critical goals stemmed from these states’ 
relationships with one another, as the French still greatly feared the possibility of future 
German aggression and wanted to see Germany held down as a result. France and 
Germany’s respective decisions to embrace integration can be directly explained by these 
and other national aims. They cannot, however, be satisfactorily explained purely by a 
desire to balance the power of the Soviet Union, as Rosato claims.
33
 As will become clear  
in the coming pages, to attempt to make the case that the Europeans’ efforts reflected a  
                                                          
33
 Rosato, 48. 
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one-dimensional desire such as this simply does not to do justice to the historical record, 
which plainly lays out a multi-causal, state-centric narrative for the genesis of European 
integration. 
 At the end of World War II, the first thing that needed to be taken care of was the 
rebuilding of a ravaged Western Europe. In France, this effort to achieve reconstruction 
took the form of Jean Monnet’s Plan de Modernisation et Ré-équipment (also known as 
the Monnet Plan), which was adopted in March 1946. This plan sought to not only 
achieve prewar levels of industrial output but also, and perhaps just as importantly, 
modernize certain key industries and, by extension, the country as a whole.  The six 
critical sectors that needed attention according to the Monnet Plan were coal mining, 
electricity, steel, cement, agricultural machinery, and transport. The target for these 
sectors was to match France’s peak interwar output – which was achieved in 1929 – by 
1948 and to exceed it by 25% by 1950.
34
  
For Monnet, the pursuit of such an ambitious plan was important largely because 
France had fallen behind the other great European powers during the interwar period. 
There had been, in his eyes, a “technological revolution” that France had missed out on, 
and he desired to see his nation catch up. As he put it, “Modernization and reconstruction 
must go hand in hand.”35 The simultaneous pursuit of these two goals, to Monnet, 
required the creation of a central plan that would guide the entire nation in its efforts. 
Such a plan was necessary because “a peacetime economy would no longer tolerate the 
wide safety margins which had been accepted for war production.” With the 
                                                          
34
 Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51, 50. 
 
35
 Jean Monnet, Memoirs (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1978), 237. 
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implementation of the Monnet Plan, improvements in critical areas such as productivity, 
economic growth, and the living standards of the French people became permanent 
national priorities. Complicated economic theories were eschewed for practical advances 
in production: bigger and better factories were the goal, and the rest was left to take care 
of itself.
36
 The rebuilding of war-torn France was essentially left completely in the hands 
of Jean Monnet and his disciples at the Commissariat Général du Plan, meaning the 
success of the plan became paramount for France’s future. In order for the Monnet Plan 
to be successful, however, France needed to have consistent access to the necessary 
natural resources. To be more specific, since the plan sought to make France more 
internationally competitive – particularly with respect to and at the expense of Germany – 
it was clear that its success was dependent upon an increase in the levels of German coal 
and coke being put into the French economy, as this was the only way the Monnet Plan’s 
lofty targets could possibly be reached.
37
 Only with massive imports from Germany 
could France become the new center of the European steel industry.
38
  
France had, after all, been dependent upon German coal and coke imports for 
decades. This dependence began in 1890 with the creation of a large basic steel industry 
in Lorraine that was based on the locally-available minette ores. After World War I, 
France’s dependence on German resources increased as the French steel industry grew. 
Smelting in particular created a heavy French need for German resources, as the French 
minette ores being used required a very large amount of metallurgical coke for their 
                                                          
36
 Gillingham, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955, 138. 
 
37
 Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51, 129. 
 
38
 Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe, 39. 
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smelting process. This came in the form of either German coke made from Ruhr coal or 
French coke that was created with Ruhr coking coals, meaning the French were 
dependent upon Ruhr resources either way. The amount of coking coal that was 
domestically available in France was simply too small to provide for the level of industry 
that France sought during the interwar period.
39
 Additionally, the inferior quality of 
French coking coal, when compared to that which was available in the Ruhr, forced 
France to look to German resources in order to create and maintain a robust domestic 
steel industry.
40
 When World War II finally ended and the French government turned to 
the Monnet Plan for its reconstruction and modernization blueprint, Ruhr resources 
became necessary again. The Lorraine blast furnaces were, after all, still geared towards 
the use of German coke, and France’s theoretical alternative supplier, the United 
Kingdom, was experiencing a decline in coal output in the immediate aftermath of the 
war. Britain, therefore, lacked an exportable surplus of the resources needed by France, 
meaning that French dependence on German coke and coal was just as acute as it had 
ever been.
41
  
The Ruhr – or more accurately the maintenance of French access to Ruhr 
resources – therefore became a focal point of French postwar policy. This became 
obvious at the seminal London Conference on Germany, which started on February 26, 
1948. The day after the conference began, the French presented their proposal to create 
                                                          
39
 Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51, 130-131. 
 
40
 Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe, 1945-67, 89. 
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 Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51, 130-131. 
Gillingham, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955, 95. 
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an international authority for the Ruhr.
42
 The Ruhr had fallen within the zone of occupied 
Germany that was under the control of the British Military Government, meaning the 
formerly privately-held mines and steel mills that existed within the Ruhr had passed to 
British government control after the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany. Seeing 
this, France desired – and believed it possible – to not only internationalize the resources 
of the Ruhr, but the management of the firms that existed within the Ruhr as well. This 
would give them the ability to influence how Ruhr coal and coke were allocated both in 
Germany and beyond its borders. Crucially, that would include exports to France, 
meaning that, with the creation of a fully internationalized Ruhr, France would be able to 
control at least to some degree how much German coal and coke were being sent to aid 
their reconstruction and modernization efforts.
43
  
By 1947, the United States was prepared to accept this French desire to 
internationalize the Ruhr and its resources. During that year, Secretary of State George 
Marshall assured the French Ambassador to the United States, Henri Bonnet, that the 
U.S. was in favor of the idea that the resources of the Ruhr should be made available for 
the recovery of the entirety of Europe rather than only that of Germany. While the 
method by which this was to be accomplished was unclear at the time,
44
 these assurances 
foreshadowed the agreement regarding the Ruhr that would be made at the London 
Conference. On May 27, 1948, the U.S., France, and Britain agreed to the French 
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 ibid., 161. 
 
43
 Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51, 149. 
 
44
 ibid., 140. 
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proposal of February, albeit with some significant modifications.
45
 This agreement set up 
the new International Authority for the Ruhr, a body which was created with the intention 
of ensuring “that the resources of the Ruhr shall not in the future be used for the purpose 
of aggression but shall be used in the interests of peace” and  
that access to the coal, coke and steel of the Ruhr, which was previously subject 
 to the exclusive control of Germany, be in the future guaranteed without 
 discrimination to the countries of Europe cooperating in the common economic 
 good.
46
  
In the interest of accomplishing these goals, the three powers gave the International 
Authority the power to, among other things,  
 make the division of coal, coke and steel from the Ruhr as between German 
 consumption and export, in order to ensure adequate access to supplies of these 
 products, taking into account the essential needs of Germany.
47
  
The powers of the International Authority were to be exercised jointly, with the United 
States, Britain, France, and Germany all having three votes in the International 
Authority’s representative body, while the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg were 
each given one vote.
48
 While this agreement committed Ruhr resources to wider 
European recovery and gave France the opportunity to exercise a certain amount of 
control over the amount of Ruhr coal and coke that was earmarked for export, the  
                                                          
45
 GIllingham, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955, 163. 
 
46
 “Paper Agreed Upon by the London Conference on Germany,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1948, Vol. II, 285. 
 
47
 ibid., 286. 
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 ibid., 285. 
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agreement did not provide for international control at the firm level,
49
 something which 
France had desperately desired in the hope that such a provision would have worked to 
prevent German evasion of the decisions handed down by the International Authority.
50
 
The International Authority for the Ruhr was not to last long, however. In 
addition to the internationalization of the Ruhr, the London Conference produced a 
recommendation to look into the internationalization of the wider European coal and steel 
industries. This recommendation, which came directly from Marshall and reflected the 
official policy of President Harry Truman, seems to have had a significant impact on Jean 
Monnet,
51
 who, on May 4, 1950, sent a memorandum to French Foreign Minister Robert 
Schuman and French Prime Minister Georges Bidault to suggest the creation of a 
supranational institution that would later be realized in the form of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC). This notion would be presented to France and the world by 
Schuman on May 9, 1950, causing the plan to place the coal and steel resources of 
Europe under supranational control to forever bear his name. Monnet’s memorandum 
stated that a primary reason behind his suggestion to create what would later be called the 
ECSC was related to France’s continued recovery. According to Monnet, France was in 
danger in 1950 of failing to achieve its goal of becoming the new industrial heart of 
Europe: 
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The continuation of France’s recovery will be halted if the question of German 
industrial production and its competitive capacity is not rapidly solved. The basis 
of the superiority which French industrialists traditionally recognize in Germany 
is her ability to produce steel at a price that France cannot match. From this they 
conclude that the whole of French production is thereby handicapped. Already 
Germany is asking to increase her production from 11 to 14 million tons. We shall 
refuse, but the Americans will insist. Finally, we shall state our reservations but 
we shall give in. At the same time, French production is leveling off or even 
falling….With the solution proposed there is no more question of domination by 
German industry….This solution, on the contrary, creates for industry – German, 
French, and European – the conditions for joint expansion, in competition but 
without domination. From the French point of view, such a solution gives French 
industry the same start as German industry; it eliminates the dumping on export 
markets which would otherwise be practised by the German steel industry; and it 
enables the French steel industry to participate in European expansion, without 
fear of dumping and without the temptation to form a cartel….The biggest 
obstacle to the continuation of French industrial progress will have been 
removed.
52
 
 
Monnet sensed that the ability of the International Authority for the Ruhr to 
protect French resource needs was in danger of faltering, largely due to an American 
desire to see increased industrial production in Germany as well as the German wish to 
be viewed as equal in the international community. Indeed, Germany resisted the 
arrangements that had been agreed upon at the London Conference, refusing to be 
represented within the International Authority until December 1949, the month after the 
Petersberg Agreement had begun giving West Germany some level of international 
recognition. Seeing that the French need for German coal and coke was not enough to 
eternally justify the subservient position that Germany had been placed in after the war, 
Monnet desired to carve out another method for securing these resources. He knew that 
“the removal of controls over the German economy would have meant renewed 
uncertainty about our vital supplies of coal, and especially of coke, and would thereby 
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have made our steel industry very much weaker than its powerful German rival.” If 
Germany wanted to increase its industrial production and begin using more and more of 
the Ruhr resources that France needed and sought to control, the International Authority 
for the Ruhr had to be replaced by a larger Western European coal and steel pool that 
would allow France to continue having unfettered access to Ruhr resources. The success 
of the Plan de Modernisation et Ré-équipment depended upon it.
53
  
The French, therefore, decided to propose the integration of Western Europe’s 
coal and steel industries partially because such a development would allow France to 
continue rebuilding and modernizing itself in the wake of World War II. Because of the 
way that the French steel industry had evolved in the years since its establishment in the 
nineteenth century, reliable and consistent access to Ruhr coke and coal was an integral 
part of the successful implementation of the Monnet Plan, meaning France needed to take 
action in the immediate postwar period to secure reliable French access to these German 
resources. When it appeared that France’s initial effort – the creation of the International 
Authority for the Ruhr – may begin faltering in this regard, the supranational control over 
Western Europe’s coal and steel industry that was embodied in the Schuman Plan was 
seen by Monnet as a viable alternative. The French therefore viewed the integration of 
Western Europe as tremendously desirable because it meant that their recovery could 
continue and France could become a modern industrial power. The destruction of the 
Continent – and particularly France – that occurred during World War II, then, led 
directly to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community. 
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The French attempt to gain and maintain some degree of control over German 
natural resources was not solely borne out of a desire to keep their nation’s reconstruction 
and modernization efforts going, however. German war-making potential entered into 
France’s calculations as well. After experiencing the dreadfulness of war with Germany 
three times since 1870, the French desired an arrangement that would prevent any further 
outbreaks of conflict between the two historic rivals. The two World Wars in particular 
had simply been too destructive and too horrific to allow for a third. This postwar fear of 
a resurgent and hostile Germany
54
 was very clearly displayed in the 1947 Treaty of 
Dunkirk that France concluded with the United Kingdom, as this treaty had as its explicit 
purpose the goal of “ensuring that Germany shall not again become a menace to the 
peace.”55 France obviously still deeply feared German aggression. As a result, the French 
wanted to see German reindustrialization handicapped in the first few years after the war 
in order to ensure their security against the Germans.
56
 As Bidault put it, “A lot of 
Frenchmen…had the vague feeling that France would not be safe if…Germany became a 
powerful industrial nation once again.”57 French efforts to prevent Germany from 
realizing its full industrial potential included the virtual annexation of the coal-rich Saar 
by France, the internationalization of the Ruhr, and the seizure of German factories as 
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reparations. A French desire to see Germany permanently occupied by the Allies was 
included in French plans as well.
58
 After the United States convinced France that such a 
policy was neither desirable nor possible but that, instead, there were other means of 
preventing future military aggression from a reindustrialized Germany,
59
 the French 
turned their focus primarily to the internationalization of the Ruhr as the means by which 
they might be able to bolster their own national security.
60
 Indeed, French – as well as 
wider European – security concerns appear in the very agreement to create the 
International Authority for the Ruhr.
61
 
When the agreed-upon International Authority for the Ruhr was in danger of 
failing to provide France with the materials it needed to continue reconstruction and 
modernization, Monnet believed that a wider supranational pooling of the coal and steel 
industries of Western Europe could take its place and keep the Monnet Plan going. 
Furthermore, such a pool would have the additional benefit of ensuring that France 
continued to experience the security against German attack that it desired. France, after 
all, was loathe to allow Germany to be free from any sort of control over its coal and steel 
industries,
62
 meaning the French believed that an alternative to the International 
Authority had to be agreed upon before it had a chance to fail because of increased 
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German steel production.
63
 French security goals were reflected in the May 9, 1950, 
announcement that Schuman made to introduce what would become known as the 
Schuman Plan. In this announcement – known as the Schuman Declaration despite the 
fact that it had been written by Monnet and two of his disciples – he stated that a peaceful 
Europe would have to be based upon “the elimination of the age-old opposition of France 
and Germany,” and that “any action taken must in the first place concern these two 
countries.” Further, he proposed  
that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a 
common High Authority, within the framework of an organization open to the 
participation of the other countries of Europe.  The pooling of coal and steel 
production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations 
for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will 
change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the 
manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant 
victims. The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any 
war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but 
materially impossible.
64
 
The French had very good reason to believe that the pooling of French and 
German coal and steel resources would help provide security for their nation. These 
resources, which had been made tremendously valuable with the arrival of the Industrial 
Revolution, were spread over a triangular area that lay primarily in Germany but was 
nevertheless intersected by the two countries’ national boundaries. According to Monnet,  
Neither country…felt secure unless it commanded all the resources – i.e., all the 
 area….Coal and steel were at once the key to economic power and the raw 
 materials for forging weapons of war. This double role gave them immense 
                                                          
63
 Jean Monnet, “Memorandum sent by Jean Monnet to Robert Schuman and Georges Bidault, 4 May 
1950,” Postwar Integration in Europe, 53-54. 
 
64
 Robert Schuman, The Schuman Declaration, May 9, 1950, http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-
may/decl_en.htm (accessed November 29, 2011). 
 
 
24 
 
 symbolic significance….To pool them across frontiers would reduce their malign 
 prestige and turn them instead into a guarantee of peace.
65
  
While their status as the most important resources for the waging of war was perhaps 
waning with the dawn of the nuclear era, coal and steel nevertheless remained the most 
critical pieces to any nation’s military buildup in 1950. They had played a decisive role in 
World War I and particularly World War II, meaning control over them had been viewed 
with envy by both France and Germany for generations.  
By pooling the coal and steel resources of the two nations under the authority of 
the European Coal and Steel Community, the French sought to make it impossible for 
Germany to rearm and initiate another destructive war between them.
66
 If the coal and 
steel resources that would be necessary for such an effort were controlled by a 
supranational authority, after all, it would reduce the propensity of either nation to use 
force to control the aforementioned triangular area of critical industrial resources. Just as 
importantly, though, it would also make it possible for France to monitor what the 
Germans were doing, immediately detect an attempt to rearm, and prevent them from 
taking aggressive action against France.
67
 The French were not afraid to make this 
important motivation behind the Schuman Declaration known to the Germans, as 
Schuman himself told West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer on the day of the 
Schuman Declaration that since “rearmament always showed first in an increased 
production of coal, iron, and steel,” the ECSC would allow both France and Germany to 
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“detect the first signs of rearmament, and would have an extraordinarily calming effect in 
France.”68 Monnet hinted at such ideas in the Schuman Declaration itself. For him, the 
purpose of the ECSC was to a large degree the protection of peace on the Continent, and, 
as a result, the essence of what France was trying to accomplish with the creation of the 
ECSC could be summed up in one sentence that appeared, underlined, in the copy of the 
Schuman Declaration that Monnet gave to Schuman:  
By the pooling of basic production and the establishment of a new High Authority 
 whose decisions will be binding on France, Germany, and the countries that join 
 them, this proposal will lay the first concrete foundations of the European 
 Federation which is indispensable to the maintenance of peace. 
According to Monnet, “the last word was the most important: peace.”69 
The latent military power of West Germany therefore also played a large role in 
convincing Monnet, Schuman, and other French politicians that the integration of 
Western Europe would be a beneficial undertaking. They, along with many others on the 
Continent, had suffered a great deal during the first half of the twentieth century as a 
result of German aggression, meaning that a certain level of fear pervaded their thinking. 
Understanding that the German coal and steel industries would be the most critical 
elements of any German effort to rearm, the French believed that the best way to prevent 
such an occurrence was to simply place these industries under a supranational authority 
such as the European Coal and Steel Community. In so doing, they believed that it would 
be possible for German activities with respect to these crucial industries to be closely 
monitored, meaning any German attempts to rearm would be detected during their initial 
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stages and stopped. France’s past experiences with Germany, then, were clearly an 
integral part of that nation’s desire to pursue the integration of Western Europe in the 
postwar period. To put it simply, the French still feared the Germans in 1950, and the 
integration embodied in the ECSC was one way in which they could make substantial 
progress toward assuaging that fear. 
The Soviet Union was also on French minds as they sought to create a Western 
European coal and steel pool. Specifically, the French wanted to ensure that Germany 
was tied irrevocably to the West. France recognized that a total European postwar 
recovery depended upon the inclusion of West German resources, and that, if they and 
the rest of the Allies continued to treat Germany as a second-class nation, it might be 
tempted to turn toward the Soviet Union for support.
70
 The answer, therefore, was to treat 
West Germany as more of an equal, but even this was not guaranteed to prevent growing 
nationalism in Germany from manifesting itself as a desire to seek reunification and turn 
towards the East. This reality led to American statements of caution with regard to 
French demands for the internationalization of the Ruhr in 1948
71
 and ultimately seems to 
have led the French to pursue supranational control over the wider West European coal 
and steel industry. If West Germany could be tied economically to France and other 
Western European countries and its coal and steel resources placed under supranational 
control, after all, it would have a much more difficult time turning its back on Western 
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Europe and making its precious resources available to the Soviets instead of to the French 
and other Western Europeans. In the words of Monnet in September 1950,  
[I]f the Germans get what the Schuman Plan offers them [i.e., reindustrialization, 
 greater equality, and, eventually perhaps even rearmament], but without the Plan 
 itself, we shall run the risk of their turning their backs on us.
72
  
To him, Germany simply had to be secured within the framework provided by the ECSC. 
The Soviet threat to Western Europe also played a role in the early success of the 
European Coal and Steel Community, but, contrary to Rosato’s arguments, only after it 
had already been proposed by the French and the drive toward an integrated Europe had 
begun. According to former Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak,  
[A] number of Western statesmen have been dubbed either ‘fathers of European 
unity’ or ‘fathers of the Atlantic Alliance’. Not one of them deserves this title: it 
belongs to [Soviet Premier Josef] Stalin. Without Stalin and his aggressive 
policies, without the threat with which he confronted the free world…the 
movement for European unity, embracing Germany as an integral part, would 
never have had the astonishing success which it has enjoyed.
73
  
The Communist menace to Western Europe, which had been a concern to the West since 
the end of World War II, seems to have been solidified in the minds of the French after 
the advent of the Korean War. Monnet recognized that the climate of fear that the June 
1950 invasion of South Korea by North Korean troops instilled throughout the Continent 
assisted in the creation of a unified Europe.
74
 This climate of fear seems to have been 
warranted, at least to a certain degree, as it was correctly assumed at the time that Stalin 
had personally approved the North Korean invasion beforehand. Such an assumption 
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naturally caused Western officials to begin comparing the divided Korea to the divided 
Germany, both of which had one side allied with the Communist world and one side 
allied with the Western world. If Stalin was willing to sanction a Communist invasion in 
Korea, it seemed logical that he might also be willing to sanction a Communist invasion 
in Germany.
75
 Certainly Adenauer saw his newly-formed Federal Republic of Germany 
as being under threat, stating that he was “firmly convinced that Stalin was planning the 
same procedure for Western Germany as had been used in Korea.”76 These assessments 
proved to be logical, as the East Germans were indeed building up their forces and 
actively training for a future conflict with West Germany.
77
 The security of the Western 
world was widely perceived to be under threat, and the integration and strengthening of 
the Western European war-making industries – particularly, of course, its coal and steel 
industries – seemed to be a logical response to the Western Europeans.78  
 Western fears about Soviet aggression also seem to have nearly had the opposite 
effect on Western European integration, however. The North Korean invasion occurred 
the month after the Schuman Declaration and only a few days after the beginning of the 
Schuman Plan conference that was convened to work out the details of the new 
community amongst the states that desired to join it. Upon hearing of the conflict, 
Monnet immediately recognized the potential disaster that it might inflict upon the still-
embryonic plan for the creation of a coal and steel pool in Western Europe. He believed 
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that the United States would not allow the Communists to get away with what they had 
done, and that the Americans would seek to prepare for further Communist action in 
central Europe.
79
 This was an accurate perception, as the fear of Soviet aggression against 
West Germany caused American officials to pursue the rearmament of West Germany, 
albeit with great trepidation.
80
 Secretary of State Dean Acheson had said only the 
previous month that the U.S. “should not contemplate building up German military 
forces,”81 after all. The French were shocked by this American about-face. Schuman had 
said the previous year that “Germany is unarmed and will remain unarmed,” and Monnet 
believed that “the mere mention of a German army was enough to horrify Europeans.”82 
No one in France wanted to see anyone return “to the former aggressor the weapons he 
had seemed glad to lay down.”83  
 The U.S. nevertheless wanted to push ahead with rearming Germany, as Germany 
would inevitably be the scene of the battle in the event of Soviet aggression and it only 
made sense to American officials that the Germans should contribute to their own 
defense.
84
 Despite the French government’s official line that “there can be no question of 
rearming Germany at all,”85 Acheson told Schuman at the 1950 Foreign Ministers 
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meeting in New York that the U.S. would only send military reinforcements to Western 
Europe if the Europeans themselves created a multinational army made up of sixty 
divisions – “ten of which might be German.” Acheson wanted these European forces to 
be assigned to the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization and put under the command of 
an American general, “probably [Dwight] Eisenhower.” To Schuman, this demand was 
unacceptable, but it nevertheless forced France’s hand. Monnet believed that there were 
three options at the time for his country: to do nothing, to treat Germany on a national 
basis and thereby unravel the budding drive towards European integration that was  
occurring on the Continent, or to create a sort of broader Schuman Plan that would allow 
the necessary actions to be taken within a European framework.
86
 The French chose the 
third option, and the European Defense Community (EDC) proposal was the result.
87
 
 The EDC was, however, an idea that came before its intended time. The French 
government had hoped that the proposal and successful implementation of the European 
Coal and Steel Community would “accustom people to the idea of a European 
Community before the delicate question of joint defence had to be broached.”88 Schuman, 
Monnet, and others realized that the creation of a joint military structure for Western 
Europe – and particularly one which might include German units – would be a difficult 
sell. Military officers disliked the proposal because they disagreed that the political 
advantages of integrating their units outweighed the organizational nightmares that came 
with it, and almost none could appreciate the economic benefits that would have come 
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along with common budgeting, centralized procurement of equipment, and the 
standardized manufacture of armaments.
89
 Many civilians disliked the EDC plan as well, 
particularly in France, where fear of German rearmament was widespread and palpable. 
Indeed, the greatest obstacles that the EDC had to overcome in order to win acceptance 
lay within the very country that proposed it: France.
90
  
The EDC was therefore doomed to fail, and mostly because it was not a truly 
European idea. It came largely as a response to the American desire to create a West 
Germany that could help provide for its own defense.
91
 Indeed, the EDC was widely 
perceived at the time as something which the United States was forcing upon France.
92
 
However, its failure to become a reality did have real, positive benefits for the ECSC. It 
took American eyes off of the ECSC for a time, allowing the Europeans to work through 
the difficulties associated with its launch and establish it in the way that they saw fit. It 
also gave French politicians the time they needed to work through their anti-German 
sentiments and become accustomed to an integrated Europe built upon and centered 
around West Germany’s tremendous economic potential.93  
The historical record, then, clearly does not support Rosato’s claims with regard 
to why the French sought to integrate Western Europe via the Schuman Plan. The 
presence of the Soviet Union does seem to have instilled within the French a greater 
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desire to see to it that Germany’s natural resources were tied permanently to Western 
Europe, as it would have been disastrous if the Germans had turned toward the East and 
added their incredible economic potential to the Soviet side. However, the historical 
record also makes it clear that the French aspiration to rebuild and modernize their nation 
as well as France’s troubled relationship with Germany played by far the most important 
roles in convincing French leaders of the desirability of integration. The impetus for the 
creation of the European Coal and Steel Community therefore cannot be accurately 
characterized as being driven by balance-of-power politics, as it was World War II – and 
not the Cold War – which played the decisive role in leading France to propose Western 
European integration. After all, the danger posed by the Soviet Union appears to have 
been solidified in the minds of Monnet and others by the Communist invasion of South 
Korea, which occurred after the Schuman Declaration had been already made. Contrary 
to the claims of Rosato, it is simply not the case that Monnet viewed the ECSC’s 
principle virtue as being its ability to create a bloc that could effectively balance the 
Soviet Union, and that this is what caused the French to endorse the Schuman Plan.
94
 It 
seems that the Soviet Union may have indeed had a role to play in fostering the success 
of early European integrative efforts in that it perhaps solidified French support for the 
Schuman Declaration once it had been made, but it certainly does not seem to have been 
critical to shaping French postwar plans for the future of the Continent. 
The reasons why the West Germans enthusiastically accepted the Schuman Plan 
when it was proposed in May 1950 are just as varied as those which are to be found on 
the French side of the story. After it had been defeated by the Allied powers and offered 
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its unconditional surrender in 1945, Germany was split into four zones: one controlled by 
the United States, one by the United Kingdom, one by France, and the fourth by the 
USSR. In addition, German industry was subject to severe output limits, reparations were 
to be extracted from the country, and the German standard of living was capped. The 
hope was that all of these requirements would make German resources available to the 
rest of Europe for its reconstruction,
95
 with the expectation being that the four victorious 
Allied powers would be able to work together to administer occupied Germany. Even 
before the 1945 Potsdam Conference that had decreed these methods for dealing with 
occupied Germany, however, Stalin had come to the conclusion that there would in fact 
be “two Germanies.” This seemed only natural considering the fact that the Soviets 
wished to impose a very different system on their portion of Germany from the one that 
the Western powers sought to put in place in theirs.
96
 The Western powers accepted this 
division of Germany as inevitable,
97
 and Secretary of State James Byrnes based his 
negotiations as well as his understanding of the outcome of the conference on this idea.
98
  
Other American officials either disagreed with or misunderstood Byrnes’ 
reasoning, however, and eventually American policy shifted toward the administration of 
Germany as a single unit.
99
 Soviet unwillingness to run German foreign trade on an all-
German basis, however, meant that administering Germany in this manner was simply 
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unfeasible, and the United States turned its attention toward the creation of a divided 
Germany made up of the Communist East and the democratic West. This was, after all, 
the obvious alternative to the failed policy of a reunified Germany. Britain quickly joined 
its zone with that of the United States, but France would not commit itself to such an 
overtly anti-Soviet policy for some time.
100
 Eventually, in 1948, after realizing that the  
French zone might become isolated as the Anglo-American “Bizone” pursued its own 
robust economic policies – some of which were detrimental to continued French recovery 
and modernization – France agreed to discuss the possibility of trizonal fusion.101  
Germany, then, was divided and being ruled over by foreign military 
governments. As a result, getting out from under occupation by the Allies and being seen 
as an equal within the international community were very important to the Germans. 
Much of this desire stemmed from the living conditions that were present in occupied 
Germany, as they were all but intolerable. Germany had been ravaged by an Allied 
bombing policy that targeted houses and apartments in an effort to paralyze the German 
economy and force a Nazi surrender. By the end of the war, over 50% – and in some 
cities, as much as 80% – of prewar dwellings had been completely destroyed, with many 
more being severely damaged. Hunger, homelessness, and cold took hold as the central 
German authorities were no longer allowed to function in the wake of the Nazi 
surrender.
102
 The lack of food for the population – each person was rationed about 1,000 
calories per day – led to constant malnutrition. This malnutrition, in turn, reduced 
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Germans’ ability to engage in meaningful work and contributed to an alarmingly rapid 
spread of serious disease.
103
 In 1946, for example, there were an estimated 260,000 cases 
of tuberculosis in the British zone alone.
104
 Additionally, the Allied Control Council in 
Berlin was not functioning properly, and, as a result, “all the efforts made in 
municipalities and even in entire occupation zones were bound to be fruitless.” Such 
conditions not only caused unbearable living conditions for the German people but also 
retarded economic recovery. This was perhaps felt most acutely in the British zone, 
which contained the all-important Ruhr. The British occupation forces were, at least 
according to one very prominent observer, “treating the population badly,”105 and the 
British Military Government was having trouble mastering its work
106
 and administering 
its zone properly.  
As a result, the West German desire to regain a position of equality and take 
control of German affairs should not be surprising. It should also not be surprising that 
such considerations did a great deal to color West German policy after the creation of the 
Federal Republic of Germany in 1949.
107
 Adenauer, the first Chancellor of West 
Germany, viewed each arrangement that was made either by the Occupation government 
or the newly-created West German government through the lens of the restoration of 
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German equality and the furtherance of German development.
108
 His ultimate goal was to 
have the numerous restrictions which had been placed on his country by the Potsdam 
Declaration and Occupation Statute removed. These restrictions were numerous and far-
reaching, and included the areas of defense, foreign affairs, occupation costs, matters 
relating to the federal and Land constitutions, reparations, foreign trade, exchange 
controls, international borrowing, decartelization, and control over the Ruhr.
109
 In lifting 
these restrictions, he desired to see his country become a valued member of the 
international community that had regained the trust and support of its Western neighbors 
and partners and was, as a result, no longer being occupied by foreign powers. To 
Adenauer, the Council of Europe seemed to be a way in which West Germany might be 
able to take a step toward this equality and “produce appreciable alleviations in the whole 
field of the occupation regime.” He was convinced that, if West Germany joined the 
Council of Europe, “the revision of the Occupation Statute…would be much more 
generous,”110 and conditions might then improve for himself and his countrymen. This 
goal of raising the standard of living not only in West Germany but across the war-torn 
Continent was eventually included in the treaty establishing the ECSC itself:  
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The European Coal and Steel Community shall have as its task to contribute…to 
 economic expansion, growth of employment and a rising standard of living in the 
 Member States.
111
  
Convincing the newly-formed West German Bundestag to join the Council of Europe and 
take the first step toward this goal would not be easy, however. 
The Council of Europe, which was meant to be the political parallel to the 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation that the U.S. had required for the 
administration of Marshall Plan aid, was proposed by France out of a desire to see an 
assembly set up for Europe. France believed that such an arrangement might give them 
an opportunity to exercise some level of control over Germany
112
 while capturing the 
German “political imagination” by presenting the country with an opportunity to have a 
place and play a role in postwar Europe. It was also intended to gain the French some 
cachet with the American government,
113
 which had been pushing for some level of 
European integration since the end of the war.
114
 At the same time, however, France was 
hoping that the Saar would be given independent membership in the Council of 
Europe.
115
 France had, of course, essentially annexed the Saar with the Allies’ blessing116 
after a favorable vote by the population of the Saar Landtag in 1947. This fusion of 
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France and the Saar was enshrined in November of that year by the establishment of a 
constitution for the Saar that instituted a monetary and customs union for the two areas. 
While technically independent, the Saar clearly had a special relationship with France 
that allowed France to have free access to the vast resources that were contained within it, 
including coal. When the Federal Republic of Germany was created in 1949, however, 
the population of the Saar became increasingly displeased with its decision to pursue 
union with France, causing fear among the French that they may not be able to retain 
their access to the Saar’s important resources. As a result, the French negotiated a new 
convention which allowed them to maintain financial and customs authority in the Saar. 
This convention also granted a long-term lease of the Saar mines to France, an action that 
allowed the French to continue having access to the Saar resources
117
 that they, of course, 
wanted for their Plan de Modernisation et Ré-équipment. 
The Germans were predictably angry about these developments. Adenauer called 
the new convention “a decision against Europe,”118 and the West German government 
decided to delay its entry into the Council of Europe as a result of the new convention, 
with the powerful Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) stating that it would 
only vote in favor of German accession to the Council if the Saar did not join as well.
119
 
The SPD was not the only party that threatened to keep West Germany out of the Council 
of Europe as a result of France’s actions regarding the Saar, meaning that the Bundestag 
simply would not vote to allow West Germany to join the Council of Europe if the Saar 
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was given full membership, too,
120
 as this would acknowledge that the Saar fell outside of 
the Federal Republic of Germany.
121
 German protests about the detachment of the Saar 
from their country were rooted not only in the economic significance of that resource-rich 
region, but also in the fact that the newly-agreed Saar conventions broke previous Allied 
promises. The Allies had “maintained the position that a change in the frontiers of 
Germany could only be made by the peace treaty,” which had not yet been signed at the 
time. The Allied governments had, in fact, “repeatedly underlined this promise,” 
according to Adenauer. The French takeover of the Saar and its valuable resources 
therefore created a situation in which general German displeasure with the Allied powers 
might increase and cause nationalist sentiments in Germany to flare up. Adenauer saw 
that “the Saar question could become a dangerous explosive, a focus of agitation for 
nationalist circles.”122 Many within the French government, however, seem to have 
ignored this possibility, as they stated at the time that they would only agree to allow 
West German membership in the Council of Europe if the Saar was permitted as a 
member at the same time.
123
 France’s conduct over the Saar caused widespread doubts  
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within Germany as to whether France seriously wanted to improve its relationship with 
its old nemesis and allow Germany to regain its status as an equal and thereby assist in 
the reconstruction of Western Europe.
124
 
As a result, something had to be done about the Saar before European integration 
could begin in earnest. The Schuman Plan was the answer. This plan provided the 
possibility of solving the Saar issue by simply placing all of the coal and steel industries 
of France, West Germany, and any other Western European country that wished to join 
under supranational control. Such an arrangement would, of course, include the Saar, 
meaning it would safeguard not only French, but also German access to the resources of 
this vital region. The Saar question, then, would more or less “solve itself.” The Schuman 
Plan also reinforced in the minds of many Germans – including Adenauer – that France 
genuinely did want to pursue an understanding with its old enemy, and that it was not 
opposed to cooperation with Germany. After all, the Germans viewed the ECSC proposal 
itself as being “based on the principle of equality”125 among the nations of Western 
Europe.  
Once the Saar had been taken care of, West Germany was able to turn its attention 
to joining the Council of Europe, a move which, again, the Germans hoped would afford 
them a less burdensome Occupation Statute. To Adenauer, either “the passage of time or 
some unforeseen event” would need to take place in order for the Bundestag to accept the 
Council of Europe’s invitation to join. The Schuman Declaration provided this 
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unforeseen event,
126
 and solved the problem of control over the Saar. “An essential 
element of estrangement” between France and Germany had been removed, Adenauer 
said,
127
 allowing West Germany to agree to join the Council of Europe no matter what the 
status of the Saar was. Simply put, the Saar did not hold the significance that it did before 
the Schuman Declaration. The German Bundestag, as a result, voted to accept the 
Council of Europe’s invitation to join on June 15, 1950, by a vote of 220 to 152.128 
The Schuman Declaration, therefore, seems to have come at the perfect time for 
the West Germans. At a time when they desperately wanted to regain their independence 
and get out from under the misery of the Allied Occupation, joining the Council of 
Europe seemed to them to be the first meaningful step that they could take toward the 
realization of these goals. The Saar, however, created a conflict between France and 
Germany that was making West German accession to the Council impossible. The 
Schuman Declaration effectively solved this problem for the Germans by safeguarding 
their access to the Saar’s critical resources no matter what the status of the Saar would 
end up being. The integration of the coal and steel industries of Western Europe was seen 
as desirable by the West Germans largely because it would allow them to settle their 
dispute with France over the Saar and take the first step on the long road to the recovery 
of their sovereignty. Far from being “obsessed” with the power of the Soviet Union as 
Rosato claims,
129
 it is clear that Adenauer’s decision to endorse the creation of the ECSC 
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was driven instead by a desire to regain independence for West Germany. Here again, the 
critical role that World War II played in the integration of Western Europe through the 
creation of the European Coal and Steel Community becomes clear, as it was this war 
which had stripped Germany of its sovereignty in the first place. Without World War II, 
then, West Germany may not have been willing to embrace supranationalism in the 
manner in which it did in 1950. 
Despite the occupation of Germany by the Allies after the war, France and other 
European countries still harbored concerns about the possibility of future German 
aggression. As demonstrated above, this was an important reason why the French decided 
to propose the coal and steel pool outlined in the Schuman Plan. These concerns were not 
totally misplaced, as nationalism had not completely gone away after the unconditional 
surrender of Nazi Germany.
130
 This became clear as the 1940s came to a close, with far-
right political parties showing up in West Germany in late 1948 and early 1949. Some of 
these groups believed that they could restore Germany’s former glory by reinstating the 
“good” parts of National Socialism.131 The reasons for this resurgence of extreme 
nationalism were many and varied. As time went by and the country began to recover 
economically, Germans began to lose their desire to “forget…that they were Germans” 
because of the horrors of the war and the total collapse of Nazi Germany. Indeed, the 
gradual recovery of West Germany instilled within many Germans a pride in their 
nation’s technical skill and incredible economic potential, and, as living conditions 
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slowly improved, people had more time to think about their perceived mistreatment at the 
hand of the Allied Occupation regime.
132
 Part of this mistreatment included perhaps 
unsurprisingly the creation of the International Authority for the Ruhr, a development 
which stripped Germany of its control over its most important industrial resource and 
thereby increased nationalist feeling. The Soviets played a role in the increase in German 
nationalism as well, though, in that the 1948 Berlin blockade was seen as an attack on all 
of Germany, not just Berlin.
133
 The presence of such a seemingly obvious danger served 
to bring Germans together and increase their nationalist sentiments. The splitting of 
Germany into East and West also bolstered German nationalism, as it represented the 
division of their great nation and provided them with another national grievance. No 
matter what the source of their nationalism, though, all nationalist Germans seemed to 
share a few things in common: pride in the powerful Wehrmacht of World War II, scorn 
for the occupying powers, some degree of anti-Semitism, and a “strong belief that 
Germany [could] again grow great as the leader of Europe.”134 By the summer of 1949, 
the Allies – particularly the British and the Americans in Bavaria – believed that they 
were “losing control” of the populations in their zones as they became less cooperative 
with and increasingly antagonistic toward the Occupation governments.
135
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The fledgling West German government understood, however, that a key part of 
ending the occupation of their country and regaining independence and equality was the 
alleviation of French and wider European security concerns
136
 driven by a fear of a new 
manifestation of militant German nationalism. They recognized that, in order for West 
Germany to regain its place in the community of nations, it would have to convince its 
neighbors that it would not act aggressively toward them in the future. Adenauer, 
accepting that the French viewed “German steel production as war potential,”137 believed 
in early March 1950 that some sort of economic merger between the two nations would 
go a long way toward assuaging French security concerns vis-à-vis Germany. He stated 
that the creation of a customs union between France and West Germany would “cause the 
rivalry of the two countries to disappear.”138 Further, he believed that such an 
arrangement would  
be a big step forward if Frenchmen and Germans sat in one house and at one table 
 in order to work together and to carry joint responsibility. The psychological 
 consequences would be inestimable. French security demands could be 
 satisfied…[and] the understanding that would grow between Germany and France 
 on this basis would be even more significant than all the economic advantages 
 that would undoubtedly accrue.
139
  
 As indicated above, the French recognized the security benefits of such an 
arrangement as well, so when the Schuman Declaration was made in May 1950, 
Adenauer quickly confirmed his interest in the proposal. The Schuman Plan did, after all, 
give both France and West Germany a concrete way to enact the type of union that 
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Adenauer had envisioned, and in a manner that was pleasing to the French. Like 
Schuman, Adenauer thought that a coal and steel pool specifically would be particularly 
beneficial for easing French fears: 
There was good reason for projecting such a scheme for iron, steel and coal if the 
goal was to do away with the differences that had for centuries existed between 
the French people and the German people. There was no better way of dispelling 
French doubts about the German people’s love of peace than to bring together the 
two countries’ production of coal, iron and steel, which were always the mainstay 
of rearmament, so that each partner in this pact would know everything that was 
happening in this important sphere. I declared my conviction that the whole 
German people desired for the future a removal of all psychological inhibitions 
between France and Germany so that at long last peace should prevail in 
Europe.
140
 
The ECSC, therefore, provided a way in which French nerves could be calmed and 
German equality could be brought nearer, as it gave the French a way to constantly keep 
an eye on what the Germans were up to, no matter how out of control their nationalism 
seemed to be getting. 
 The new West German government shared this desire to prevent German 
nationalism from continuing to develop. Indeed, the men who made up this government 
were just as capable as any other European of remembering the horrors of Nazi Germany 
and World War II. They had seen the consequences of unbridled German nationalism 
firsthand, and were aware of the fact that they simply could not let nationalism go 
unchecked in the Federal Republic of Germany as the 1940s ended and a new decade 
began. As an occupied state that was striving to regain its equality, the Germans had to 
worry about how they were perceived by other countries, and Adenauer recognized that 
bouts of out-of-control nationalism would not do anything to gain the trust of Nazi 
                                                          
140
 ibid., 265. 
 
 
46 
 
Germany’s victims, even if it was thought that the most violent possible manifestations of 
this nationalism could be kept in check by the European Coal and Steel Community. He 
also feared the detrimental impact that resurgent nationalism would have on the stability 
of the young West German state. Extra-parliamentary nationalist groups led by popular 
demagogues appeared particularly dangerous to Adenauer in this regard.
141
 The Soviet 
Union entered Adenauer’s calculations as well, as the possibility that German nationalists 
might end up turning towards the USSR for support because of how the Allies were 
treating West Germany seemed to him to be a very real danger.
142
 This fear of a Soviet-
dominated Germany was shared by many in the West, though, who thought that a West 
Germany that came under the control of far-right nationalists might pursue unification 
with East Germany and form some level of union with the Soviets.
143
 The Allied decision 
to allow France to essentially annex the Saar seemed particularly salient in this regard, as 
it led to a great deal of anger and annoyance with the Allies and the West among 
Germans
144
 for the reasons outlined above. Indeed, two of the ministers in Adenauer’s 
own government were making public speeches that seemed to support German  
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nationalism with regard to the Saar in early 1950, meaning action needed to be taken 
quickly by the Adenauer government to prevent German nationalism from peaking within 
the country.
145
 
 As was the case with regard to French security concerns, some type of Franco-
German economic merger seemed to be the answer to Adenauer in March 1950. He 
thought that such a development would allow German nationalism to be brought under 
control and prevented from getting out of hand
146
 because it would go a long way toward 
resolving the aforementioned issues that were driving Germans to embrace excessive 
nationalism. It would also allow Germany to take the first steps towards equality and 
independence, a condition which Adenauer believed would cause “radical tendencies in 
Germany…to collapse and become an insignificant fraction of public opinion” as 
Germany was brought “back to an honourable place in the family of free peoples.” Such a 
development would also give Germany access to the resources that it needed to pursue 
economic growth and the alleviation of very difficult postwar living conditions. Such a 
development, according to Adenauer, would help eradicate the nationalism that was 
taking hold in his country because “radicalism was to a large extent the bitter fruit of 
post-war distress.”147 When the Schuman Declaration came along, then, he was quick to 
embrace it, as it provided a concrete method for solving the German nationalism issue.  
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This was critical if the Adenauer government wanted to see an internally-stable West 
Germany that was able to assuage the fears of its neighbors while resisting the pull of 
unification at the expense of falling into the Soviet sphere of influence. 
 As with the French side of the story, then, it is clear that Rosato’s balance-of-
power argument simply is not supported by the historical record. Instead, the West 
German reasons for accepting the French suggestion to create a supranational coal and 
steel pool in Western Europe were multidimensional and did not simply reflect an 
overwhelming desire to balance the Soviet Union. They were also much different from 
the reasons why the French decided to put forth the Schuman Plan. In addition to 
recognizing that it would solve the problem of the Saar and allow them to join the 
Council of Europe, the West Germans believed that the creation of the European Coal 
and Steel Community would help to assuage French fears of future German aggression. It 
was also seen as a way to prevent German nationalism from getting out of control, as this 
would be disastrous not only for West Germany but for all of Western Europe, 
particularly if it caused Germany to reunify and fall into the Soviet sphere of influence. 
The obvious overarching goal that drove all of these motivations was the West German 
desire to regain the sovereignty that it had lost when Nazi Germany unconditionally 
surrendered to the Allies in 1945. Here again, then, the critical importance of World War 
II to the European integration narrative becomes clear. While the threat of Soviet 
influence in Germany certainly seems to have been on the minds of West German 
statesmen, the conditions created in West Germany in the aftermath of the war were  
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much more important, meaning the Germans’ desire to pursue the integration of Western 
Europe simply cannot be attributed solely – or even predominantly – to a desire to 
balance the power of the Soviet Union.  
Not every policy elite in France and West Germany supported the idea of placing 
the coal and steel resources and industries of Western Europe under the supranational 
control of the European Coal and Steel Community, however. In France, while “people 
imagine retrospectively that the government and Parliament enthusiastically welcomed 
the idea of an Iron and Steel Pool,” Bidault states that “this is far from true, although 
some of the men who opposed it then later became supporters of the plan.” For proof that 
the Schuman Plan ran into trouble, he cites the fact that the Schuman Declaration took 
place on May 9, 1950, but that it was not until December 13, 1951, that the French 
Chamber of Deputies actually ratified the Schuman Plan.
148
 According to him, there were 
many reasons why French members of parliament opposed the Schuman Plan:  
Some were concerned about their personal interests, others disapproved of the 
 European Community in principle, and there were some who just found any 
 change suspect. They made many speeches against the Plan, some of which were 
 very clever, others merely emotional.
149
  
Indeed, the idea to place the coal and steel resources of Western Europe under 
supranational authority had to overcome significant obstacles in France.  
The opposition to the Schuman Plan in the French government came from the 
Communists and the Gaullists, on the far Left and the far Right, respectively. The former 
stated that the ECSC was a “vast plan to deport workers, who are looked on as cattle or 
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mere merchandise to be sold abroad,” and the latter prophesied that a plan like the ECSC 
meant that, “All customs barriers will fall, and the whole French market, from Strasbourg 
to Brazzaville in the Congo, will be inundated by the dynamism of German industry.”150 
Sovereignty concerns were also important to the Gaullists, who on December 6, 1951, 
formally declared their opposition to the Schuman Plan on the basis that it placed the 
management of French coal and steel in the hands of “an uncontrolled authority without 
democratic responsibility.”151 Retaining the advantages that France had gained with the 
Allied victory in World War II seems to have been important to the Gaullists as well. 
According to General Charles de Gaulle, after his government left power in France in 
1945,  
Everything I had accomplished by dint of arduous efforts, as regards the 
independence, the status and the interests of France, was immediately 
jeopardized. Lacking the drive and energy thanks to which we were on our feet, 
the regime was to all intents and purposes concerned with pleasing others. 
Naturally enough, it found the required ideologies to camouflage this self-
effacement: the one, in the name of European unity, liquidating all the advantages 
which victory had gained us…152  
While the opposition of these groups never made up a parliamentary majority in France 
and the Treaty of Paris ended up being ratified by the Chamber of Deputies
153
 and the 
Senate by large majorities, Monnet nevertheless believed that “there could be no  
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doubt…that the concerted nationalism of Left and Right would form a constant barrier to 
Europe’s progress.”154 The European project would go ahead in France, but not without 
facing the opposition of some French policy elites. 
 West Germany faced much the same issue when it came to the ratification of the 
Schuman Plan. There, Kurt Schumacher’s SPD pledged to oppose the creation of the 
ECSC.
155
 Calling Adenauer the “Chancellor of the Allies,” Schumacher opposed any 
effort to integrate West Germany into the West. This included the ECSC, which he 
derided as a scheme to keep Germany weak, divided, and under capitalist domination. 
Instead of recognizing as Adenauer did that the Schuman Plan would help West Germany 
achieve equality within the international community, he believed instead that it would, in 
fact, deny West Germany the equality and sovereignty that it desired.
156
 He also believed 
that Adenauer’s policies were generally meant to place West Germany under the control 
of “a reactionary international coalition…between the Roman Catholic Church and 
Western industrialists.” He thought that such an arrangement “not only threatened the 
establishment of a truly democratic (i.e. socialist) Germany, but would revive strong 
authoritarian, anti-capitalist, and radical nationalist sentiments.” The ECSC, to 
Schumacher, belonged among the group of Adenauer policies which would lead to this 
destabilizing outcome.
157
 Finally, Schumacher claimed that each new agreement that 
West Germany entered into made it more difficult for the two halves of Germany to be 
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reunited,
158
 a notion which was probably true, and which flew in the face of 
Schumacher’s preferred policy of reuniting Germany even at the risk of offending the 
Western powers. As he and many of his deputies were natives of either East Germany or 
Berlin, such a goal is perhaps not surprising.
159
 The probability of reuniting Germany 
under conditions which favored the West – a prerequisite as long as the Western Allies 
occupied West Germany – was likely a pipe dream by the time of the Schuman 
Declaration, however. In the end, the SPD’s opposition to the Schuman Plan simply was  
not enough to block the ratification of the Treaty of Paris,
160
 largely because Schumacher 
had lost the support of Germany’s biggest labor union, which supported and actively 
negotiated for the acceptance of the Schuman Plan in the Bundestag.
161
 
 It was not only within the ranks of the French and German parliaments that 
opposition to the creation of the ECSC surfaced. The industrialists of not only France and 
West Germany but the other four initial member states of the ECSC – Italy, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg – expressed opposition to the Schuman Plan as well. In 
February 1951, the industrialists of the Six mounted a concerted effort to oppose the 
Schuman Plan’s supranational elements, which they asserted constituted “a framework 
for a super-managed economy depriving the responsible owners of all initiative and 
making them a mere ‘conveying belt’ for super-government control.” Further, they 
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believed it was ultimately a move “toward enforced nationalization.”162 In all six nations, 
the industrialists wanted to retain their ability to decide on prices and production, 
something which was supposed to pass to the ECSC’s executive High Authority.163 
Additionally, they sought to retain some degree of control over the management and 
futures of their enterprises and wanted the treaty establishing the ECSC to include 
mechanisms which would allow for its modification in the future.
164
 Eventually, the 
industrialists in the all-important Ruhr agreed, at the urging of Monnet, Adenauer, and 
U.S. High Commissioner for Germany John J. McCloy,
165
 to support the Schuman Plan, 
albeit with some reservations. With the assent of these exceptionally powerful so-called 
“Ruhr Barons,” it became possible for West Germany and the rest of the Six to sign the 
Treaty of Paris on April 18, 1951.
166
  
 In sum, it is clear from the historical record that one simply cannot point to a 
desire to balance the power of the Soviet Union in order to accurately explain why the 
Europeans pursued the integration of the Continent in the aftermath of World War II. 
Instead, it was this horrific war that created the conditions in Western Europe that led to 
the French proposal and German acceptance of the Schuman Plan. The reconstruction 
and modernization of France, the assuagement of French security concerns, the end of the 
Allied Occupation regime and the restoration of West German sovereignty, and the 
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prevention of another bout of out-of-control German nationalism were the goals which 
were seen as being served by the pooling of Western Europe’s coal and steel industries. 
The reasons why France and West Germany pursued the creation of the ECSC were, 
therefore, many and varied, meaning the narrative provided by the historical record is 
much more complicated than the one provided by Rosato. The Soviet Union certainly had 
a role to play in the eventual success of the ECSC, but it is, in fact, the relationship 
between France and Germany in the aftermath of World War II that takes center stage in 
this story, as the drive toward the creation of a unified Europe had already begun when 
the French fully recognized the potential threat that the USSR posed to Western Europe 
in 1950. 
 The significance of this understanding of the genesis of European integration is 
clear. While the Soviet Union has indeed ceased to exist and is no longer a threat to 
Western Europe, this does not mean that the unraveling of European integration is 
inevitable. Instead, since the reasons why France and Germany pursued integration were 
predominantly related to the outcome of World War II and, critically, their relationship 
with each other, the dissolution of the Soviet Union has very little to do with an accurate 
understanding of or prediction regarding European unity. In France, the overriding 
concerns in the postwar era were French recovery and German aggression, and it was 
these goals that led French policy elites to embrace Western European integration. French 
control over German resources and the ability hold the Germans down and ensure they 
would not initiate another war were critical parts of addressing of these issues. The Soviet 
Union does seem to have had a role to play in the success of the proposed Schuman Plan, 
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but after it had been agreed upon, meaning that a desire to balance the power of the 
Soviet Union did not play into the initial French decision to propose integration. The 
Germans, on the other hand, desired the return of independence and normalcy to their 
state, meaning their actions were not driven by the presence or power of the Soviets, 
either. They knew that it would take a great deal of time and effort for them to reestablish 
German sovereignty, and the creation of the ECSC was seen as the first step toward the 
realization of this goal. 
  France and West Germany saw their respective national interests as being served 
by the creation of the ECSC, then, and, as long as these states’ modern-day incarnations 
believe that their interests are still being served by their continued participation in an 
integrated Europe, they are highly likely to keep supporting it. Indeed, even though the 
goals being pursued by these states when they set up the ECSC were generally 
accomplished long ago, that does not mean that integration cannot continue to be 
beneficial to them. States’ interests are apt to evolve over time, but that does not 
necessarily prompt them to radically alter their entrenched institutional associations. The 
most powerful Continental leaders seem to understand this and also seem to believe that 
retaining their EU membership is currently in their respective states’ best interests, as 
former French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
recently proposed a deeper fiscal integration of the eurozone countries in a bid to find a 
permanent solution to the European debt crisis. This proposal included greater restrictions 
on taxation and spending, with automatic penalties for states that break the rules.
167
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European leaders have also agreed upon the creation of a €700 billion firewall for the 
Continent that will provide financial stability going into the future,
168
 and European 
finance ministers have agreed to allow the European Union to scrutinize eurozone 
members’ budgets before they are approved by their respective national parliaments.169 
Merkel has also presented a vision of Europe that has a much more federal structure, with 
the EU making strides toward becoming the Continent’s central government.170 These 
developments obviously fly in the face of Rosato’s notion that the dissolution or 
weakening of the union ought to be expected in the post-Cold War security 
environment.
171
 Furthermore, as these proposals to deepen European integration have 
come about as a result of the economic problems that Europe is currently experiencing, 
Rosato’s belief that economic problems should cause Europe’s “fraying” to accelerate172 
appears to be incorrect.  
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 Ultimately, Rosato’s ideas are built upon an incorrect reading of history. The 
historical record makes it clear that the original goals of the European politicians who 
pursued the union of their Continent were largely state centric, with each state focused 
predominantly on its own individual economic and political interests. The French desired 
the integration of the Continent mostly because it would give them unfettered access to 
German resources, allowing them to continue their postwar reconstruction efforts while 
holding down and closely monitoring West Germany. The Germans, on the other hand, 
agreed to the French proposal for integration principally because they believed it would 
serve their overarching goal of regaining sovereignty, equality, and their place in Europe. 
These states were clearly pursuing Continental unification primarily because they 
believed that that was what was best for their respective countries as they moved forward 
in the wake of World War II. Rather than taking the fact that EU member states flout 
European laws and norms as a sign that the integration of Western Europe was driven by 
the Cold War, as Rosato has done,
173
 such malfeasance should simply be viewed as a 
continuation of the state-centric, national interest-driven policies of France and West 
Germany that were so prominently displayed in the earliest days of European unification. 
Advanced European political and military unions meant to move completely beyond 
intergovernmentalism and shape the Continent into some type of super-state were never 
inevitabilities, as these were not the original purposes of European integration. The 
French and the West Germans were indeed willing to surrender some of their sovereignty 
to the supranational European Coal and Steel Community, but only because they believed 
they would be reaping very valuable benefits for their individual states as a result.  
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 Rosato, however, has misunderstood the interests that the Europeans believed 
were being served by the genesis of European integration. He asserts that a group of 
minor powers that is attempting to balance a great power will pursue an integrated 
military establishment as well as a central authority,
174
 causing him to mistakenly believe 
that the fact that full-blown political and military unions have not been forthcoming on 
the Continent in the post-Cold War era is due to the Soviet Union’s collapse. This is not 
the case. As Rosato himself argues, advanced political and military unions were 
eschewed both during the Cold War
175
 as well as after it.
176
 This indicates that the 
presence or absence of the Soviet threat has had little bearing on whether or not Europe 
has pursued these types of deeper integration. Simply put, if the European Union decides 
to break up or, more likely, pursue further integration in the future, it will be because the 
most important EU member states see such a course of action as being in their respective 
states’ best interests and not simply because the Soviet Union crumbled in 1991.
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Three 
American Contributions 
 The historical record makes it very plain that the United States played a critical 
role in the successful establishment of an integrated Western Europe. The U.S. emerged 
from World War II as the most powerful country in the world, with enough might and 
capital to approach the Continent in essentially whatever manner it chose. Europe, on the 
other hand, had experienced unprecedented destruction during the war, placing the U.S. 
in the position to have a tremendous amount of influence over the affairs of Western 
Europe in the postwar period. After some initial debate within the U.S. regarding how to 
deal with the vanquished Germany, it became clear to the Truman administration that this 
nation held a position of central importance to the future of Europe, as its great natural 
resources and industrial potential were seen as critical to the reconstruction of the 
Continent. As a result, the encouragement of European integration became official 
American policy. With its power and influence brought to bear on the situation, the U.S. 
was able to not only do a great deal to encourage the Europeans to pursue integration, 
but, just as importantly, it was able to create the type of security situation that was 
necessary to assuage French concerns about a reindustrialized and no longer occupied 
Germany. Further, after the Dwight Eisenhower administration took office, a great deal
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was done to ensure that the fledgling European Coal and Steel Community would be able 
to successfully get off the ground. As a result, the contribution of the United States to the 
genesis of European integration was essential. Further, as the following pages will make 
clear, the notion expressed by Rosato that U.S. encouragement was neither sufficient nor 
necessary for the successful implementation of European integration
177
 is simply not 
supported by the historical record. 
 The struggle over how to approach the defeated Nazi Germany began in the 
United States even before the war had come to an end. As the country which was to 
escape from the war with the least destruction and most power, it fell very naturally to the 
U.S. to take the lead in deciding the postwar order. In 1944, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt created a Cabinet-level committee, made up of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, 
Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, to 
consider precisely how Germany ought to be dealt with.
178
 Morgenthau, for his part, 
believed that Germany would have to be treated extremely harshly in order to prevent it 
from initiating another conflict with its neighbors.
179
  
In a memorandum which was given to Roosevelt and brought to the 1944 United 
States-United Kingdom conference in Quebec, Morgenthau suggested that Germany 
should be totally stripped of its armaments, its armament industry, and any other industry 
that might be used for the creation of military strength. To do this, he thought that the 
Saar should be annexed by France while the Ruhr was “not only stripped of all presently 
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existing industries but so weakened and controlled that it can not in the foreseeable future 
become an industrial area.” Additionally, Morgenthau said, 
Within a short period, if possible not longer than 6 months after the cessation of 
 hostilities, all industrial plants and equipment not destroyed by military action 
 shall be completely dismantled and transported to Allied Nations as restitution. 
 All equipment shall be removed from the mines and the mines closed.
180
  
Finally, the Morgenthau Plan would have sent the entire German labor force to work on 
farms, a program which would have offered “security to [the U.S.] as well as food for 
Germany and her neighbors.” He recognized that his plan would “involve hardship and 
hard work for several years” and that there would “be considerable unemployment in the 
difficult transition period.”181 This did not seem to bother him, though, as he told his 
chief assistant, “I don’t care what happens to the population [of Germany].”182  
In September 1944, Roosevelt accepted the Morgenthau Plan for Germany,
183
 and 
forced British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to sign onto it at the aforementioned 
Quebec conference.
184
 Fortunately, though, no firm arrangement was ever put in place to 
implement the destructive and shortsighted Morgenthau Plan,
185
 and Roosevelt eventually 
let it drop in order to prevent his Cabinet from becoming irreconcilably divided.
186
 Hull 
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and Stimson did, after all, strongly disagree with Morgenthau’s ideas, causing American 
and therefore wider Allied work on how to deal with postwar Germany to stall. Unlike 
Morgenthau, the Secretaries of State and War recognized that Germany occupied a key 
place in Europe’s economy, as it provided not only a great deal of manufacturing 
potential but also a significant market for the goods of its neighbors.
187
 Stimson argued 
further that Germany’s incredible industrial potential should be kept intact and made 
available for use by Europe as a whole as it sought to rebuild itself after the war. The 
internationalization of the Ruhr, he thought, might be a way in which this could be 
accomplished.
188
 In the end, Roosevelt changed his mind on the Morgenthau Plan and 
placed American planning for postwar Germany in the hands of Hull and Stimson alone, 
removing Morgenthau from his Cabinet committee all together.
189
 Germany’s vast 
industrial potential was simply too important to the Continent for it to be destroyed. On 
April 12, 1945, however, Roosevelt passed away, leaving Vice President Harry Truman 
to ultimately decide along with the Allies how best to deal with postwar Germany.  
Despite the Roosevelt administration’s eventual recognition that Germany was 
important to the recovery of Europe, the Truman administration did not initially fully 
grasp how dependent the recovery of Europe truly was on the recovery of Germany.
190
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This was made clear, though, after the brutal European winter of 1946-1947, the worst in 
a century. Rail and barge traffic was brought to a halt and industrial production was 
interrupted for weeks at a time by the unusually harsh weather.
191
 Worse yet, the bitter 
winter combined with subsequent floods and droughts “which cut Western Europe’s 
grain crop to the lowest figure in generations.”192 Hunger and disease spread quickly 
throughout the Continent, and there were rising concerns that the distress being felt in 
Western European countries would cause the populations there to turn toward 
Communism for relief.
193
 The war had, quite simply, done more damage than the 
Americans realized,
194
 and the recovery process was extremely fragile.
195
 In early 1947, 
many prominent individuals within the American government realized that something 
had to be done to help Europe get back on its feet. There was no specific plan in place 
when Secretary of State George Marshall announced the United States’ intention to assist 
the European recovery on June 5, 1947,
196
 however, as it had not been until the Moscow 
Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in the spring of 1947 that Marshall had decided to 
announce what would later become known as the Marshall Plan.
197
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In his private talks with Stalin during the Moscow Council, Marshall realized that 
the Soviets understood the impact that the conditions in Europe were having and sensed 
that they wanted to intentionally delay the recovery of the Continent. This was because 
Stalin knew, like many in the West, that the Communists in Western Europe would 
benefit politically from chaos and rapidly deteriorating living conditions.
198
 Truman 
asserted further that  
the communists have announced determined opposition to any effort to help 
 Europe get back on its feet. There will unquestionably be further incitements to 
 strike, not for the purpose of redressing the legitimate grievances of particular 
 groups, but for the purpose of bringing chaos in the hope that it will pave the way 
 for totalitarian control.
199
  
The Soviets were simply not negotiating in good faith, and Marshall realized that either 
the United States would have to give up on Europe or work toward completing the 
recovery of the Continent on its own.
200
 The Truman administration chose the latter, and 
the Marshall Plan was the result. The American focus remained on Germany, though, 
where the U.S. was an occupying power with “major responsibilities”201 and the 
industrial heart of Europe lay. As former President Herbert Hoover put it after going to 
Germany on an official government mission in February 1947, “We can keep Germany in 
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these economic chains but it will also keep Europe in rags.”202 Simply put, if the U.S. 
wanted to prevent the Soviets from making headway in Western Europe, the 
reconstruction of the continent was a necessity, and if this were to happen, Germany 
would have to be revitalized.
203
  
Balance-of-power politics, then, may have determined the manner in which the 
Truman administration approached the Continent. The Americans clearly recognized that 
the Communists in Western Europe were able to benefit from the economic malaise that 
had gripped that part of Europe since the end of World War II, and that, in order to 
prevent them from gaining a foothold in that region, reconstruction would have to be 
quick and complete. While Rosato may attempt to argue that, as a result, the entirety of 
the drive to integrate Western Europe through the creation of the ECSC can be boiled 
down to balance-of-power thinking, such sentiments would be misplaced. Rosato argues, 
for one thing, that the Americans’ contribution to the integration of Western Europe was 
largely immaterial, meaning that, by extension, the motivations held by the United States 
would also have to be immaterial. However, despite the critical role that the American 
contribution to the creation of the ECSC played in reality, this contribution facilitated 
rather than motivated the Europeans’ actions, meaning the Americans’ reasons for 
supporting the Europeans as they sought a unified Continent do not, by necessity, have 
any bearing on the Europeans’ motivations for doing so. While the Americans’ 
motivations for assisting the Continent are, indeed, perhaps best described as being 
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driven by balance-of-power considerations, this is fundamentally different from claiming 
that the Europeans sought to integrate Western Europe because they were attempting to 
balance against the Soviet Union. One cannot take the motivations of the United States 
government and impose them upon the European policy elites that were involved simply 
because both groups sought the same outcome. 
The Truman administration believed that in order for the reconstruction of Europe 
to be successful, it would have to involve more than American assistance to the 
Continent. Instead, the administration envisioned the creation of a unified Europe with 
the industrial resources of Germany at its center. John Foster Dulles, who accompanied 
Marshall on his trip to the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers as a special advisor, 
made statements along these lines in a speech that he gave on January 17, 1947. In it, he 
stated that the tremendous industrial potential of Western Germany should be integrated 
into Western Europe, as such an arrangement would provide a check against future 
German aggression while creating a more stable and prosperous Western Europe. The 
wisdom of these ideas was accepted by the Americans after the unsuccessful Moscow 
Council, which had solidified in their minds the fact that the German problem was really 
at the heart of the European problem and that it simply could not be settled outside of a 
European framework of some kind.
204
 As Truman put it,  
European recovery is essentially a problem for the nations of Europe. It was 
 therefore apparent that it could not be solved, even with outside aid, unless the 
 European nations themselves would find a joint solution and accept joint 
 responsibility for its execution. Such a cooperative plan would release the full 
 productive resources of Europe and provide a proper basis for measuring the need 
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 and effectiveness of further aid from outside Europe, and in particular from the 
 United States.
205
 
Ultimately, Truman believed that “Europe had to be rehabilitated by the people who 
destroyed it.”206 The United States could not do it on its own, and it could not do it while 
dealing with a fragmented Continent. 
In 1947, others in the American government echoed the idea that Europe would 
have to become unified if it were to recover properly. On March 21 of that year, both the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Relations 
passed a resolution which stated that, “Resolved by the Senate (the House of 
Representatives concurring) that the Congress favors the creation of a United States of 
Europe.” The day before his June 5 speech at Harvard announcing the Marshall Plan, 
Marshall himself responded to this Congressional resolution. In a letter to Arthur 
Vandenberg, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Marshall 
asserted that there was a fundamental difference between what the Truman administration 
was trying to accomplish and what the Congress was trying to accomplish. While he was 
“deeply sympathetic toward the general objective of the [Congressional] resolution,” he 
asserted that the initiative for the unification of Europe had to come from Europe. It could 
not be forced upon them by the United States, as Marshall believed the Congress wished 
to do.
207
 This was an important point, and one which both the Truman and Eisenhower 
administrations held to during their years in office. Both of these presidents, while 
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desiring to see the integration of Europe and believing that the United States had a critical 
role to play in this process, understood that the impetus for such a development had to 
come from the Europeans themselves, particularly the French.
208
 Regardless of these 
differences between the White House and Congress, however, the overall objective – the 
integration of Europe – was the same, and the Foreign Assistance Act, which put the 
ideas behind the Marshall Plan into law, reflected this goal:  
Mindful of the advantages which the U.S. has enjoyed through the existence of a 
large domestic market with no internal trade barriers, and believing that similar 
advantages can accrue to the countries of Europe, it is declared to be the policy of 
the people of the U.S. to encourage these countries through a joint organization to 
exert sustained common efforts…which will speedily achieve that economic 
cooperation in Europe which is essential for lasting peace and prosperity.
209
 
The Marshall Plan was therefore clearly meant to lay the foundation for a unified  
Europe
210
 that would be less prone to initiate another devastating war or fall into the orbit 
of the Soviet Union and more capable of increasing its industrial production and pulling 
itself out of the postwar quagmire that it had found itself in. 
In order for the Marshall Plan to accomplish these goals, the Truman 
administration believed that France had to be on board with it. Indeed, the administration 
saw France as the very “lynchpin” of the plan.211 The French, on the other hand, were 
extremely wary of the war-making potential of a reindustrialized Germany, particularly 
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one that was no longer being occupied by the Allies.
212
 In the immediate aftermath of the 
war, the French wished to see the creation of a largely dismembered Germany, although 
not to the almost unfathomable extent that Morgenthau had envisioned in 1944. 
Crucially, they wanted to see a decentralized and permanently occupied Germany
213
 with 
the Ruhr and the Saar – the most important industrial areas of Germany – 
internationalized
214
 and taken over by France, respectively.
215
 The United States, then, 
needed to convince France to accept the full-scale reindustrialization of Germany in order 
for the Marshall Plan to be effective and Western Europe to recover. The aid that the 
Marshall Plan promised to France in 1947 went some way toward accomplishing this for 
the Americans, as the French themselves saw the Marshall Plan as a way to purchase 
their assent to German reconstruction.
216
 Indeed, Marshall Plan aid probably did a great 
deal to help convince the French over the next few years to accept American policy 
positions with regard to Germany, as France became heavily dependent upon it for the 
continuation of the Plan de Modernisation et Ré-équipment. By 1949, 90 percent of the 
Monnet Plan’s resources came from Marshall Plan aid,217 meaning France relied at that  
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point almost completely on American assistance as it attempted to reconstruct and 
modernize its most important industries. This assistance, as a result, simply had to keep 
flowing into France.  
While the Marshall Plan helped bring the French a step closer to accepting the full 
reindustrialization of Germany, they nevertheless held onto other demands that they 
believed would further their security against the Germans. One of these demands was, of 
course, the internationalization of the Ruhr that was proposed at the 1948 London 
Conference on Germany.
218
 Just over a week before the London Conference began, 
French Ambassador to the United States Henri Bonnet called Under Secretary of State 
Robert Lovett in order to “reiterate the importance which his Government attached to 
reaching agreement at London on…international control of Ruhr production.”219 The 
United States had been willing to accept international control of Ruhr resources since at 
least 1947,
220
 as the Truman administration understood how critical these resources were 
to wider Western European recovery after the war.
221
 It was concerned, however, about 
how such a move would be received in Germany, where nationalism was on the rise as 
the 1940s came to a close.
222
 As a result, Marshall, less than a week before the London 
Conference began, sent a telegram to Lewis Douglas, the American Ambassador to the 
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United Kingdom, giving him some “general background and guidance” for the upcoming 
conference. In it, Marshall stated,  
The necessary restrictions on German control of [the] Ruhr which may result from 
an international agreement with respect to [the] control of Ruhr resources would 
be much more acceptable to [the] Germans if it embodies a contribution on their 
part to a larger Western European Union, to [the] realization of which other 
Western European countries will also be making substantial contributions of one 
kind or another. 
The German solution, then, according to Marshall,  
 had a two-fold aspect: (a) economic and political reorientation of Germans, 
 fostered by [the] common policies of Western occupation powers; and (b) 
 integration of Western Germany into [the] Western European community.
223
  
Douglas brought these guidelines to the London Conference when it began on 
February 26. Two days later, after the French had formally proposed the 
internationalization of the Ruhr, Douglas  
stressed US sympathy with [the] principle [that] access to Ruhr products should 
 not be exclusively controlled by Germany and readiness [to] consider proposals 
 for long-term control [of the] Ruhr in [the] post-occupation period.  
He also said that he  
would hope, however, [that] such control would be of such [a] nature that 
Western Germany and Western Europe would be effectively integrated and [that 
it] would not be punitive so as to create conditions in Germany which we all 
desire to avoid and which would increase [the] bargaining power of [the] Soviet 
[Union] in Germany. While realizing [that] international control would have to set 
at rest [the] fear of Germany’s western neighbors, [it is] also important that it 
have [the] effect of making [the] German people feel part of Western Europe 
instead of turning them to [the] east. [The] US [has] attached very great 
importance to economic integration [in] Western Europe. Therefore very 
tentatively and very informally, he wanted to suggest that [an] international 
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regime might look toward inclusion [of] not only [the] Ruhr but also similar 
industrial regions of Western Europe.
224
 
While affirming the Truman administration’s desire to see the Ruhr resources made 
available to the entirety of Western Europe, Douglas’ comments stressed that France and 
the rest of the Allies ought to be wary of the potential unintended consequences if such a 
move were made in an exceptionally punitive manner. Indeed, the administration thought 
it would be wiser to create some sort of larger framework that all of Western Europe 
could be a part of than to simply take the Ruhr and its tremendous resources away from 
Germany without giving them anything in return. Further, it believed that an international 
regime that would include both German and wider Western European resources would 
assuage the security concerns of Germany’s neighbors, prevent Germany from becoming 
extraordinarily nationalist or Eastern-leaning, and help foster the integration of Western 
Europe, something which had become very important to the Truman administration.
225
 It 
would accomplish these things by making the German people feel as though their nation 
was truly part of the Western community of nations, and not as though they were to be 
the perpetually trod-upon losers of World War II.  
 While Douglas believed at the time that his remarks at the London Conference 
“might be too ambitious and might look too far into the future,”226 what he said actually 
ended up having a tremendous impact on the future of Europe. Shortly after the 
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conclusion of the London Conference, the chief of the French Foreign Ministry’s 
European desk wrote a background paper that acknowledged the wisdom of Douglas’ 
comments. In it, the Frenchman criticized the French government for not seriously taking 
up the suggestion made by the United States that more than just the Ruhr should be 
placed under some type of international control and asserted that the other industrial 
regions of Western Europe should indeed be included as well. The author went on to 
insist that Germany was integral to the unification of Western Europe. Without it, 
European integration was nothing more than a “myth.”227 Douglas’ comments and this 
background paper seem to have had, in turn, an impact on Jean Monnet, as, in 1950, the 
Schuman Plan – which was remarkably similar to what Douglas had suggested and the 
French background paper had echoed – was announced. It appears, then, that a 
connection can be drawn between Truman administration policy and the Schuman 
Declaration via the 1948 London Conference. While the impetus to create a supranational 
authority for the coal and steel resources of France, West Germany, and other countries in 
Western Europe came from Europe – as Truman believed it must – the idea behind it 
was, in fact, originally American.
228
 To be sure, it can never be known with absolute 
certainty whether Monnet would have come up with such an idea in the absence of 
American influence. However, it can be said that, as it happened, his idea to take the 
“functional approach” to European unity229 likely stemmed at least to some degree from 
the comments that Douglas made in London in 1948, as these comments provided 
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concrete ideas for Monnet to work with as he pondered the value of Western European 
integration for France. American encouragement of the integration of Western Europe 
through the Marshall Plan and the Truman administration’s recognition that the industrial 
resources of the Ruhr, Saar, and other parts of Western Europe would be needed for the 
revitalization of the entire Continent lead very naturally to the ideas at the heart of the 
Schuman Declaration.  
 American involvement, therefore, seems to have played a critical role in shaping 
the Schuman Plan. Not only did Truman work to foster European integration through the 
Marshall Plan and its Organization for European Economic Cooperation, but the wariness 
that he had about alienating Germany by stripping it of its ability to control the Ruhr also 
led to his administration’s urging of the French to pursue a wider coal and steel pool of 
some sort. His actions make it clear that he understood the importance of German 
industry to postwar Western Europe, meaning that he simultaneously wanted to allow the 
rest of that part of the Continent to have access to German resources while not losing 
West Germany to the Soviets. France, which held a critical role in this entire effort, 
seems to have been heavily influenced by the Truman administration’s ideas, as 
Monnet’s plan for the pooling of all of Western Europe’s coal and steel resources closely 
paralleled the suggestions that Douglas made at the 1948 London Conference. French 
acquiescence to German reconstruction was also realized partially through the 
tremendous amount of aid that the Marshall Plan had been able to contribute to the 
Monnet Plan. The critical role of World War II, which vaulted the United States to its  
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position of preeminence and gave it its extraordinary ability to exercise influence over 
German and French postwar policies, can therefore again be seen remarkably clearly in 
the story of European integration. 
 France, however, required more than Marshall Plan aid and the 
internationalization of the Ruhr in order to feel sufficiently comfortable with the total 
reindustrialization of Germany. Even though the internationalization of the Ruhr allowed 
France to exercise some control over the distribution of its vast resources and helped 
assuage French security concerns,
230
 it was still not enough to fully convince the French 
that the reconstruction of Germany would not place them in danger. The French were, in 
fact, so concerned about the danger posed by Germany in the immediate postwar period 
that they concluded a mutual defense treaty with the United Kingdom that was 
specifically aimed at Germany
231
 and wanted to see Germany remain occupied by the 
Allies indefinitely.
232
 By 1949, though, Secretary of State Dean Acheson saw the 
“diminution of direct allied control over Germany and the progressive reduction of 
occupation troops” as “inevitable.” He and his Executive Committee on Foreign 
Economic Policy had asserted five years before, after all, that, “An indefinitely continued 
coercion of more than sixty million technically advanced people…would at best be an 
expensive undertaking and would afford the world little sense of real security.”233 On the 
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other hand, he recognized that without some sort of security pact between the United 
States and the French, it was doubtful that they would ever accept such a minimally-
supervised Germany,
234
 let alone a completely reindustrialized one that might be capable 
of rearming itself as it had done in the interwar period. David Bruce, the U.S. 
Ambassador to France, shared these sentiments, stating in October 1949, 
All of the nations that were defeated by Germany in the last war, and in previous 
wars, are conscious of her latent power and are haunted by the fear that a 
reconstructed Germany will choose Russia rather than the West in the event of 
another war. This underlying reality cannot be disregarded or expected to 
disappear overnight. It must be accepted as a basic factor and compensated for as 
such. That is why the [State] Department’s telegram appears to be unrealistic in 
urging that France alone can take the lead in bringing about the reintegration of 
Germany into Western Europe. France, and indeed no continental power, can take 
that lead without assurances of the full backing of the US…accompanied by 
precise and binding security commitments looking far into the future.
235
 
 The 1949 North Atlantic Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) that it created provided the answer to this problem of French insecurity vis-à-vis 
a reconstructed Germany. France greatly feared being left alone on the Continent with 
Germany, and the Truman administration believed that NATO was the way in which it 
could prove to the French that they were not going to be abandoned by the United States, 
even after it eventually stopped occupying West Germany.
236
 In addition to its obvious 
purpose of securing an American commitment to defend the Continent in the event of a 
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Soviet attack, then, NATO was created in part in order to provide security for France and 
the other NATO member states against renewed German aggression, thereby paving the 
way for West Germany to be fully reindustrialized and integrated into the Western 
European community.
237
 The French, for their part, recognized that one of the major 
purposes of NATO was to assuage their fears of a revitalized Germany. Indeed, by the 
time the North Atlantic Treaty was ratified by the French Assembly in July 1949, many 
French politicians recognized that a unified Europe would have to include Germany, and 
that it simply could not function successfully as an economic unit without it. NATO 
made it possible for them to embrace this reality, as it guaranteed that the United States 
would come to their rescue if the Germans ever decided to initiate a conflict with them 
again.
238
  
 The United States, therefore, clearly provided the security environment which 
made the creation of the ECSC a possibility. While Rosato is right in stating that the 
American security guarantee was not the motivation behind the Europeans’ desire to 
pursue European integration,
239
 it certainly did a great deal to alleviate French security 
concerns about a reindustrialized Germany, even one that was no longer occupied by the 
Allies. Without the inclusion of a fully reindustrialized Germany that was capable of 
contributing its tremendous economic potential to the coal and steel pool that the 
Schuman Plan envisioned, the ECSC likely would not have become a reality. The United 
States – and, to be more specific, the Truman administration – made the creation of the 
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European Coal and Steel Community possible by providing the security umbrella which 
made the French comfortable with the industrial situation in Germany that was necessary 
for proposing and, ultimately, implementing it.
240
 Completely discounting the “U.S. 
pacifier” argument, as Rosato has done,241 is incorrect as a result. Rather than looking at 
the guaranteed American military assistance that NATO provided as the reason why the 
French and the West Germans sought to pursue the unification of the Continent, one 
ought to recognize that it was this American security guarantee that made it possible for 
them to do so. In a word, it facilitated rather than motivated the implementation of the 
Schuman Plan. 
 The United States’ policy of actively encouraging the creation of an integrated 
Europe did not change when Dwight Eisenhower became president in January 1953. As 
was the case with Truman, much of Eisenhower’s motivation for supporting the 
Europeans’ drive toward unification stemmed from the Cold War conflict between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. As excessive German nationalism was still an issue 
when he took office,
242
 the Eisenhower administration was concerned about this 
nationalism getting out of control. In the words of U.S. High Commissioner for Germany 
Walter Donnelly,  
 Unless Ger[man] dynamism is able to express itself constructively by 
 participation in close European cooperation and in achieving an important place 
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 in world affairs, the more constructive pro-European German leaders will be 
 discredited, and more extreme men will take their places.
243
  
The greatest danger that came along with German nationalism was the possibility that 
German nationalists might seek to exploit East-West tensions and pursue the 
reunification of their country in a manner that could lead to an Eastern-oriented Germany. 
This was a disaster scenario for the Eisenhower administration, which knew like its 
predecessor that the industrial resources of West Germany were critical to Western 
European reconstruction and feared further that adding such resources to the Soviet side 
could upset the balance of the postwar bipolar world order in their favor.
244
 Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles believed that if nationalism was allowed to take over in West 
Germany, the desire to reunify with the eastern half of the country would  
 become so strong in Germany as to give rise to [the] temptation to discard the 
 associations with the West in an effort to advance reunification on terms which 
 would at best result in a neutral Germany and at worst result in an Eastern-
 oriented Germany.
245
  
If this were to happen, the administration feared that nationalist movements in other 
Western European states might subsequently be kindled,
246
 causing the entire effort to 
integrate Western Europe to be put at significant risk. Eisenhower, therefore, believed  
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that tying West Germany irrevocably into Western Europe was the only way to prevent 
these things from happening, meaning that the successful establishment of the ECSC was 
critical. 
Eisenhower also believed that the United States stood to benefit substantially 
from the integration of Western Europe. He envisioned a united Europe becoming the 
world’s “third great power bloc,” a development which he thought would be able to 
“solve the peace in the world.”247 Specifically, he held that “a united Europe consisting of 
250 million-odd people, of whom at least 23 million were skilled workers, would create 
an industrial complex comparable to the United States,” and that “such a ‘third force’ 
working with the rest of the free world would change the whole complexion of present 
circumstances and insure peace.”248 Like many in Europe,249 then, Eisenhower thought 
that an integrated Continent would be able to present itself as something of a third 
superpower, able to place its weight on the scales and tip them in favor of peace. The 
assumption among Americans was and had been for many years, of course, that the side 
that most favored peace was the United States, and that Western Europe would naturally 
gravitate toward it instead of toward the Soviet Union.
250
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While this would certainly be beneficial to the Europeans as they sought to 
prevent Soviet aggression against them, it would also assist the Americans by taking 
some of the pressure of defending Western Europe off their shoulders. Eisenhower 
recognized that the creation of a “third force” in Europe would allow the United States to 
“sit back and relax somewhat,”251 as it would make the Western Europeans capable of 
taking more responsibility for their own defense.
252
 Further, Eisenhower believed that a 
unified and prosperous Western Europe would be capable of attracting all of the Soviet 
Union’s Eastern European satellite states to it. This would cause the Soviet sphere of 
influence to contract dramatically, allowing the West to gain a considerable power 
advantage and making the threat to peace “disappear.”253 Such developments would be of 
great benefit to the U.S., as Eisenhower was concerned about the large amount of money 
that the U.S. was spending each year to keep troops stationed in Europe
254
 and hoped that 
the American military could eventually permanently return to North America.
255
 The 
successful establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community and the subsequent 
strengthening of Western Europe were, therefore, high priorities for the Eisenhower 
administration, as they represented the first steps toward the accomplishment of this goal. 
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 Like Truman, Eisenhower also realized that the impetus for European integration 
had to come from the Europeans themselves. It simply could not be forced upon them. He 
nevertheless thought that the United States had a significant role to play in assisting their 
efforts. In his first State of the Union address, delivered on February 3, 1953, he stated, 
The needed unity of Western Europe manifestly cannot be manufactured from 
without; it can only be created from within. But it is right and necessary that we 
encourage Europe’s leaders by informing them of the high value we place upon 
the earnestness of their efforts toward this goal. Real progress will be conclusive 
evidence to the American people that our material sacrifices in the cause of 
collective security are matched by essential political, economic, and military 
accomplishments in Western Europe.
256
 
Eisenhower was not alone in his belief that American assistance to the Continent was 
essential. Monnet, for his part, also recognized how important it was to the establishment 
of the fledgling European Coal and Steel Community that American support for it 
continued beyond the end of the Truman administration. Indeed, he believed that 
American support would be critical if the ECSC were to become a successful initial 
manifestation of integration on the Continent.
257
 Adenauer echoed these sentiments, 
stating that as the Truman administration vacated the White House,  
 The decisive question for us was whether the Eisenhower administration would 
 continue the European policy of the Democratic Party and President Truman. All 
 were agreed in Europe that without the support of the United States the decline of 
 Europe would be irreversible.  
He was relieved, therefore, when, in 1953, “the American interest in the integration of  
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Europe …was expressed even more strongly than in the second half of 1952.”258 Policy 
elites on both sides of the Atlantic, then, clearly viewed American support for the 
Europeans’ drive toward integration as essential to its ultimate success.  
 The first manifestation of this support came very early in the operation of the 
ECSC. On February 18, 1953, just eight days after the common market for coal opened, 
Eisenhower appointed David Bruce to be the U.S. Representative to the Coal and Steel 
Community at Luxembourg, giving him the rank of ambassador. The State Department 
explained, 
By broadening his assignment in this way we will derive the maximum 
psychological impact in Europe from this important new step….In addition, the 
designation of Mr. Bruce to the CSC would be looked upon by Mr. Monnet and 
his associates as perhaps the clearest indication we could give of our close support 
for and belief in their experiment in six-country unification.
259
 
By appointing a U.S. ambassador to the ECSC so early in its operation, the Eisenhower 
administration publicly demonstrated its interest and faith in what was being 
accomplished in Western Europe. Monnet recognized the gravity of this development, 
asserting that the dispatch of an official American representative to the ECSC established 
the community’s sovereignty and its place as a recognized entity under international 
law.
260
 Giving Bruce the rank of ambassador put the United States’ relationship with the 
ECSC on par with its relationships with other states, after all. Gaining an established 
diplomatic connection to the most powerful Western country in the world also likely  
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cemented the legitimacy of the ECSC in the minds of potential member states and trading 
partners, increasing the probability that it would be able to survive the first few months 
and years of its operation and become successfully established within Western Europe.  
 In addition to international recognition, the fledgling ECSC needed the proper 
funding in order to be set up successfully. Despite the fact that it had inherited a less-
than-ideal fiscal situation from the Truman administration,
261
 a June 1953 visit from 
Monnet – a close personal friend of Dulles262 – convinced the Eisenhower administration 
that the timing was right for the United States to step in and provide this funding.
263
 As a 
result, on June 15, Eisenhower sent a letter to Senator Alexander Wiley, chairman of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and Representative Robert B. Chiperfield, 
chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which strongly encouraged them 
to support the extension of an American loan to the ECSC.
264
 These letters were well-
received by both Wiley and Chiperfield,
265
 but no action was immediately taken to make 
the loan a reality. Eisenhower refused to let the idea die, though, and, as 1953 came to a 
close, he released a statement stating that he  
 was encouraged that the Coal and Steel Community is now in effective operation, 
 and reaffirm[ed] his hope that ways might be found to enable the United States to 
 assist, on a loan basis, in modernizing and developing…this Community.266  
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 As expected, the ECSC’s High Authority – the executive branch of the ECSC, 
headed by Monnet himself – responded favorably to Eisenhower’s suggestions. It drafted 
a resolution for the Common Assembly of the ECSC which stated that the assembly 
welcomed “warmly the declaration of the President of the United States” that the 
unification of Europe is a “necessity for the peace and prosperity of Europeans and of the 
world.” In addition, the Common Assembly approved the idea of establishing a 
partnership between the United States and the ECSC on the basis of cooperation instead 
of on the basis of aid.
267
 The Europeans recognized that, since the Eisenhower 
administration was proposing a loan instead of a grant to the ECSC, the United States 
trusted them and had faith in their ability to create a successful, united European 
community that would be capable of administering itself properly and paying back loans 
in a timely manner. Monnet also worried that an indefinite donor and receiver 
relationship between the U.S. and the ECSC would eventually harm the vital connection  
that existed between the two entities.
268
 He and the Common Assembly desired to get 
away from this model, which had formed the basis of the Marshall Plan,
269
 and pursue a 
place of greater equality within the international community.  
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 While Monnet pressured the Eisenhower administration to make the ECSC loan at 
least $400 million in order to ensure that it would properly “capture European 
imagination,”270 Harold Stassen, the American Director of the Foreign Operations 
Administration, believed that such a loan would be excessive. Instead, he suggested that 
the U.S. provide a $100 million loan to the ECSC to be used  
 for the improvement of coal mines, power plants and coke plants, all of which 
 will strengthen the base of the Western European economy, improve its capability 
 to finance its own defense, and…encourage the essential move toward European 
 integration, which is highly desirable as a part of…basic policy.271  
While Monnet initially balked at this figure,
272
 he eventually accepted it after a meeting 
with Dulles in March 1954.
273
 The next month, the Eisenhower administration and the 
High Authority of the ECSC agreed to the terms of a $100 million loan with an interest 
rate of 3.7 percent.
274
 To Monnet, this loan was critical. He believed that, at the time that 
the loan was conferred upon the ECSC, no state could have obtained such favorable 
terms from the United States government, and that this gesture from the Eisenhower 
administration firmly established the ECSC’s credit worldwide. As a result, despite only 
being in its first year of full operation, the ECSC could “already think of borrowing on 
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the private capital market.”275 The American loan to the ECSC, while not as large as 
Monnet and others would have liked, nevertheless gave the ECSC the funds it desired 
while opening the door to immediate borrowing from other sources. In its earliest days, 
the United States clearly helped the ECSC get off on the right foot and establish itself 
within Western Europe and the wider international community when it might not have 
otherwise been able to do so. 
  In early 1955, however, Joseph Dodge, chairman of the Council on Foreign 
Economic Policy, sent a memorandum to the State Department that accused the ECSC of 
allowing “cartel developments” within its member states and raised the question of 
whether, as a result, “U.S. policy concerning the Community should be subject to further 
consideration.”  In response to these concerns, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic 
Affairs Samuel Waugh conceded that “it is apparent that various restrictive arrangements, 
including the steel export cartel, exist among the industries of the CSC,” but nevertheless 
recommended “that the United States should continue its strong support for the High 
Authority and the Community especially in view of the far-reaching significance of the 
CSC as a major step toward European unity.” He went on to state further  
 that the facts currently available to the Department concerning the points raised 
 by Mr. Dodge…do not warrant a reconsideration at this time of U.S. policy 
 towards the Coal and Steel Community.
276
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 One month later, Dulles himself addressed Dodge’s concerns. He, like Waugh, 
agreed that restrictive practices detrimental to American industry were in place in the 
ECSC. He was aware that the steel producers of the ECSC had indeed established a cartel 
to fix minimum prices for the community’s exports and that it had also designated two or 
three American scrap dealers as “exclusive agents for scrap purchases in the United 
States.” While this naturally led the administration to question “the compatibility of the 
exclusive scrap purchasing arrangement with CSC objectives of establishing and 
maintaining competitive conditions in the Community,” Dulles believed that it was not 
enough to warrant the termination of the Eisenhower administration’s emphatic support 
for the ECSC, including the $100 million loan that had been agreed upon the year 
before.
277
 Indeed, Dulles, who was willing to allow short-term European needs to take 
priority over American interests while the ECSC worked to establish itself,
278
 assured 
Dodge in his official response to the Council on Foreign Economic Policy that the 
restrictive arrangements would not last forever and stressed that the United States needed 
to continue looking at the bigger picture. He said, 
Some steps have already been taken by the High Authority against restrictive 
arrangements and we have been assured that further measures are now in 
preparation. We consider that there are reasonably good prospects for further 
progress by the Community in combating such arrangements. The developments 
cited by Mr. Dodge should, moreover, be considered in the broad perspective of 
the Community’s potential contribution to U.S. interests in Europe….The 
European Coal and Steel Community represents a dramatic movement in the 
direction of European unity, the promotion of which has been established by 
Congress and the Executive Branch as a basic objective of U.S. policy….[T]he 
Community serves as a rallying point for those upholding the idea of a united 
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Europe. United States support for the CSC is widely recognized as a symbol of 
U.S. interest in encouraging progress towards this goal….The provisions of the 
CSC Treaty directed against monopolies and restrictive business practices…are 
completely unprecedented in Europe. While the Community’s progress in 
combating restrictive practices has been slow, it has been substantially more 
active in this sphere than most individual European governments or other 
international bodies….Much remains to be done, however, and we should 
continue to give all possible encouragement to these governments, as well as to 
the High Authority, toward further development of programs for the elimination 
of restrictive business practices.
279
 
 In conclusion, Dulles stated,  
 The facts currently available to the Department concerning reported cartel 
 developments in the CSC, in conjunction with the steps which the High Authority 
 has taken and is anticipating in implementing the anti-cartel provisions in the CSC 
 Treaty, do not warrant a reconsideration at this time of U.S. policy towards the 
 Coal and Steel Community.
280
 
The Eisenhower administration essentially argued that the ECSC simply needed more 
time, patience, and encouragement from the United States to implement the provisions of 
the Treaty of Paris, which included anti-cartel and trade liberalization provisions. The 
successful establishment of the ECSC was so important to the Eisenhower administration 
that it was willing to tolerate short-term restrictive European practices that had a negative 
impact on American economic interests in the hope that this would help integration 
become permanently established on the Continent.
281
 It understood how difficult it was to 
set up a new supranational community like the ECSC – particularly since it was also 
attempting to implement policies that had never before been seen in Europe – and 
decided as a result to give it essentially as much time as it needed. The integration of 
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Western Europe was simply too important to be interrupted by the short-term interests of 
U.S. industry. The Eisenhower administration also clearly recognized that, eventually, the 
existence of the ECSC would likely prove to be very beneficial for U.S. economic 
interests and that, in reality, it was doing a better job of combating restrictive practices 
than many European governments. After some short-term pain, the administration 
believed that American industry would experience long-term benefits. Monnet and the 
High Authority just needed a bit of time to get their feet on the ground. 
 All told, then, Rosato’s claim that American encouragement was neither a 
necessary nor sufficient condition for European integration to take place
282
 is clearly 
misguided, as it is simply not supported by the historical record. If his notion that the 
Western Europeans desired to integrate the Continent simply to balance the power of the 
Soviet Union were correct, such a claim may be logical. The previous chapter 
demonstrated that this was not the case, however. Rather than focusing on the power of 
the Soviet Union and trying to unite the Continent to balance it, the French and the West 
Germans were primarily interested in their own national interests, which included 
postwar recovery, the alleviation of French security concerns with regard to West 
Germany, and the renewal of West German sovereignty. Again, it was World War II and 
its aftermath – not the Cold War – that caused the Europeans to desire integration. The 
Americans, who had been put in a position of incredible power by the war, created the 
environment within which the Europeans could pursue their goals. Indeed, the American 
policy of ardently encouraging and supporting European unity in the postwar era, which 
spanned both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, played a critical role in  
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making it possible for the ECSC to succeed. While these administrations had different 
roles to play, both of their contributions to the earliest years of European integration were 
vital to the successful establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community.  
 The Truman administration had the tremendous responsibility of deciding with 
the Allies how postwar Europe should be addressed.  In their minds, it was critical that 
the region immediately rebuild itself without falling into the sphere of influence of the 
Soviet Union or starting yet another global conflagration. Tying West Germany and its 
resources irrevocably to the West through Continental integration was seen as the key to 
accomplishing these goals, and, despite its recognition that the impetus for European 
integration had to come from the Continent itself, the administration did whatever it 
could to ensure that the majority of French and West German politicians were supportive 
of this idea.  Not only did it use the Marshall Plan’s Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation to lay the foundations for a unified Europe, but it also used Marshall Plan 
aid to help convince the French to accept U.S. policy vis-à-vis West Germany. The 
Truman administration also worked to prevent the French from becoming so focused on 
retaining their access to German resources that they would alienate the West Germans 
and cause their increasing nationalism to get out of control. The American suggestion that 
the internationalization of the Ruhr be folded into a wider Western European coal and 
steel pool – the basic idea behind the Schuman Plan – was the way in which this was 
accomplished. Perhaps most critically, though, the Truman administration used NATO to  
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create the type of security environment that would allow the French to embrace the 
reindustrialization of West Germany as well as its inclusion in the Western European 
community, even after the Allied occupation eventually ended.  
 Upon taking office, the Eisenhower administration decided to continue the 
Truman administration’s policy of encouraging European integration, although perhaps 
for slightly different reasons. It had, however, come to office after the European Coal and 
Steel Community had already been agreed upon. This gave it the opportunity to ensure 
that the still-embryonic ECSC would be successfully established. From international 
legal recognition through the dispatch of an American ambassador to the establishment of 
the ECSC’s credit through the granting of a substantial loan to allowing American 
economic interests to temporarily be placed on the back burner while the Europeans 
worked to properly establish their new community, the actions that were taken by the 
Eisenhower administration were critical. Without the actions of these two 
administrations, it seems likely that the unification of the Continent never would have 
occurred and, even if it had, it would not have experienced the success that it did. Indeed, 
even Monnet and Adenauer recognized the incredible importance of American support 
and encouragement for what they were trying to accomplish, and were anxious to see 
these things continue to come from the White House when the Eisenhower administration 
took office in 1953. As the most powerful state in the world with a great deal of influence  
over the affairs of France and West Germany, the United States played a crucial role in 
the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in a manner that no other 
country could have. 
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Four 
Conclusion 
 The preceding pages have, through an examination of the historical record, made 
it plain that France and West Germany were driven to pursue the creation of the 
European Coal and Steel Community for state-centric reasons that came about largely as 
a result of their relationships with one another within the postwar context. World War II 
is, again, critical to gaining an accurate understanding of the genesis of European 
integration. Additionally, it should be apparent that the United States did indeed play a 
decisive role in not only the creation of the ECSC, but also its successful establishment in 
the 1950s. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations saw the unification of Western 
Europe as a critical foreign policy goal, and they can both be pointed to as effective 
facilitators of the Europeans’ desire to pursue the integration of the Continent. The 
creation of a counterfactual may be a useful way to explore these points further and 
demonstrate quite clearly that both Rosato’s balance-of-power argument283 and his claim 
that American involvement in early European integrationist efforts was neither sufficient 
nor necessary for Continental unification to take place
284
 are indeed incorrect. This will  
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be accomplished, of course, by constructing an alternate world in which Rosato’s claims 
are correct, and will allow the reader to clearly understand what one would and would not 
expect to find in the historical record of such a world.  
 The motives that drove France and West Germany to pursue the unification of the 
Continent through the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community will be 
addressed first. If Rosato’s argument were correct, and the Europeans sought to integrate 
solely in order to balance the tremendous power of the Soviet Union, this would be 
reflected in a number of differences in the historical record. First, one would see a clear 
indication that the Soviet Union was seen in postwar France as a much bigger threat than 
Germany, despite the fact that Germany had invaded France twice in the last half century 
and the Soviet Union had not. This would have manifest itself partially through a French 
decision to eschew the creation of new treaties like the Treaty of Dunkirk that explicitly 
named Germany as a security threat and would require, of course, that the recent history 
of terrible warfare that France had experienced with Germany be eclipsed in the minds of 
the French essentially immediately after the end of World War II by the prospect of going 
to war with the USSR.  
 The replacement of Germany by the Soviet Union as France’s greatest security 
threat would have brought along with it a number of practical implications as well, 
including a substantially weakened desire in France to see Germany held down. Indeed, if 
the Soviet Union was France’s focus in the postwar period, then the French would have 
embraced not only the end of the Allied Occupation regime, but also, and just as 
importantly, the complete reindustrialization and rearmament of West Germany. These 
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things would, in fact, likely have been a priority for France. In addition, if the French 
were simply trying to balance the power of the Soviet Union and were less interested in 
the reconstruction of their own country, then unfettered French access to the industrial 
resources of the Ruhr and the Saar would not have been one of France’s highest 
priorities. Instead, the French would have wanted to see German industrial production 
expand, even at the expense of French access to these resources, as this would have 
transformed West Germany into a much more powerful and useful ally against the 
Soviets that stood geographically between France and the USSR. The French desires to 
internationalize the Ruhr and maintain control over the Saar through a customs union and 
the admittance of the Saar as an independent member of the Council of Europe would not 
have had much salience in such a situation, and the French would not have pushed hard 
for them and allowed them to become the sources of tension with and nationalism in 
West Germany that they ended up being. 
 The timeline of European integration also would have been drastically altered if 
the French had been principally concerned with balancing the Soviet Union. If the USSR 
was France’s principle security threat and it was more interested in being allied to a 
strong West Germany that could help it balance the USSR than in seeing its long-time 
nemesis held down in the wake of the most destructive war in world history, then the 
French would have pursued the integration of Western Europe earlier than 1950, when 
the Schuman Declaration was made. This is because the security guarantee against 
Germany that was given to France by the United States through the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization would not have been necessary, meaning France would not have had any 
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reason to wait until after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty to propose the creation 
of the ECSC. Instead, France would have proposed the integration of the Continent at the 
first sign of trouble for Western Europe from the USSR – presumably the 1948 Berlin 
Blockade – as the threat posed by the USSR would have had to have been solidified in 
the minds of the French long before the outbreak of the Korean War, which occurred 
after the Schuman Declaration.  
 Additionally, France would have proposed a much different-looking form of 
European integration if the Soviet Union was the target of such action. While it would, 
perhaps, still have made sense to build up Western Europe’s war making ability via the 
integration and strengthening of France and West Germany’s coal and steel industries, it 
would have been a priority for France to create an integrated military command for the 
Western European nations that were integrating. This is because, as Rosato points out, 
when a group of minor powers is attempting to balance a great power, they will create an 
integrated military establishment and central authority,
285
 as this is the most efficient and 
effective way to balance the threat that is posed by such a power. As a result, France 
would have proposed this form of integration either at the same time that it was 
proposing the ECSC or, more likely, in place of the ECSC, as this would have allowed 
Western Europe to have its best shot at balancing Soviet power. 
 Things also would have been much different in West Germany if the French and 
the Germans had been pursuing Western European integration purely to balance the 
Soviet Union. First of all, any vestiges of conflict between France and West Germany 
would have been effectively put on the back burner as they paled in comparison to the 
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perceived Soviet threat. As stated above, France would have, instead, been concerned 
primarily with seeing to it that West Germany became a powerful ally against the 
Soviets, meaning Germany would not have had to deal with the Allied Occupation 
regime in the manner in which it did. This, in turn, would have led to a decreased desire 
by the West German government to secure independence and the restoration of German 
sovereignty in the wake of the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany, meaning West 
German accession to the Council of Europe would not have held the significance that it 
did. Indeed, France may have been able to convince the United States and United 
Kingdom to end the occupation not too long after the war, as it no longer feared German 
aggression above all else and would have prioritized the creation of a strong West 
Germany that stood between it and the Soviets. West German sovereignty would have 
subsequently been restored and the West German government would not have seen the 
restoration of the equality of their country as their overriding goal. If this would not have 
been possible, however, the West Germans nevertheless would have viewed balancing 
the Soviet Union as a more important goal than the restoration of German sovereignty 
and the end of the occupation, meaning the presence of British and American troops 
would have been welcomed, not loathed, as these troops would have been on hand – and 
would have dragged these two states into war on the side of West Germany – in the event 
of a Soviet invasion. In addition, since France would have feared Soviet aggression 
instead of German aggression, the West Germans would not have had to worry about 
assuaging French security concerns as part of their attempt to regain their sovereignty. In 
fact, this would have been a non-issue, as the French would have been far more worried 
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about the Soviets than they were about the Germans, who they would have viewed as 
their partners in defending Western Europe from the Communists rather than their 
historical enemies who could rise up against them again at a moment’s notice. 
 On the American side of the story, if the efforts of the United States to encourage 
and support European integration were unnecessary and the Europeans would have 
pursued Continental integration in order to balance the threat posed by the Soviet Union 
regardless of what the Americans were doing, the historical record would, again, reflect 
these differences. For one thing, while the United States likely would have nevertheless 
viewed the encouragement of the integration of Western Europe as a foreign policy 
priority, the concrete ideas about how this should be executed that it shared with France 
would not have had the impact that they did. As stated above, it seems logical that France 
may have proposed something similar to the ECSC in an effort to balance the USSR, but 
it is more likely that it would have proposed an integrated military structure for Western 
Europe. If the United States’ efforts were insignificant, therefore, the French would have 
followed a different course of action from the one that had been suggested to them by the 
United States at the 1948 London Conference on Germany. The U.S. would not have had 
to make these suggestions in the first place, though, as the internationalization of the 
Ruhr at West Germany’s expense would not have been a high priority for France and the 
Americans would not have been worried about the alienation of the Germans.   
 This alternate course would also include, as indicated above, the announcement of 
the Schuman Plan before the creation of NATO, as the security guarantee provided by 
American forces against the Germans would have been unnecessary and irrelevant if the 
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French saw the USSR as their primary security threat. The Truman administration would 
not have viewed Marshall Plan aid as a way of purchasing French assent to German 
reconstruction, either, as France would have embraced this reconstruction 
wholeheartedly, as made plain above. Additionally, the European leaders who were 
primarily responsible for the creation of an integrated Europe would not have made it 
clear through their words and their deeds that the U.S. had an integral role to play in the 
successful establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community. Monnet, for his 
part, would not have approached the Eisenhower administration for a loan in the manner 
that he did, and he would not have pointed to the United States as the nation that 
established the ECSC’s credit worldwide and gave it its tremendously important ability to 
borrow from private lenders through the conferral of this loan. Monnet also would not 
have stated that the United States’ decision to dispatch an ambassador to the ECSC was 
what gave the community its legal standing in the international system, and neither he nor 
Adenauer would have explicitly said that American support for and encouragement of 
European integration were essential. 
 Finally, if the Europeans had been solely motivated by a desire to balance the 
Soviet Union, then the European Union surely would have become obsolete the moment 
the USSR collapsed and no longer posed any sort of threat to the Continent. If the states 
involved in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community and the subsequent, 
more complicated iterations of Continental integration that followed were simply trying 
to balance the power of the Soviet Union, after all, then European integration would have 
completely lost its purpose as soon as the Soviet Union ceased to exist, meaning Rosato’s 
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notions regarding the inevitable “fraying” of the European Union286 would be correct. 
One must keep in mind, however, that the historical record indicates very clearly that the 
Europeans were not simply attempting to balance the power of the Soviet Union as they 
unified the Continent. It also makes it plain that the efforts of the United States to 
facilitate the Western Europeans’ pursuit of integration were critical, and that European 
integration likely would not have happened apart from them. Indeed, the entirety of the 
foregoing counterfactual is, quite obviously, not historically accurate in the least, 
meaning Rosato’s claims cannot be accurate either, as, if they were, the counterfactual 
presented above would not be a counterfactual at all. Instead, it would simply be a 
description of the historical record. 
 What the historical record does show very clearly, however, is that, far from being 
an effort to balance the Soviet Union, the creation of the European Coal and Steel 
Community was an attempt by France and West Germany to pursue separate sets of state-
centric goals that each country’s government believed would be beneficial for its 
respective state. In France, these goals stemmed primarily from two sources: France’s 
need to maintain access to German natural resources in order to keep its Plan de 
Modernisation et Ré-équipment operating smoothly, and its fear of future German 
aggression in light of its experiences since 1870. Monnet believed that the creation of the 
European Coal and Steel Community would be the most effective way to maintain 
French access to important West German natural resources while allowing the French to 
keep a close eye on the Germans and ensure that they were not using their coal and steel  
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industries to rearm themselves as they had done in the interwar period. In essence, France 
wanted to regain its strength while Germany was held down, and this was the underlying 
factor that ultimately drove the actions of the French. 
 The West Germans, on the other hand, were focused on the restoration of their 
sovereignty, independence, and equality within the international community after the 
unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany. Adenauer believed that joining the Council of 
Europe would be an effective first step on the road toward this goal, but the status of the 
Saar had to be satisfactorily worked out before this could happen. West Germany’s 
accession to the ECSC was able to solve this problem while simultaneously helping to 
assuage French security concerns and stem the tide of growing German nationalism. 
Rather than being “obsessed” with the power of the Soviet Union, as Rosato claims,287 
Adenauer, along with Monnet, Schuman, and the other pioneers of European integration, 
was focused on the national goals that could be accomplished through the creation of the 
European Coal and Steel Community. The beginning of the Cold War and a desire to 
balance the power of the Soviet Union simply did not cause the Western Europeans to 
pursue the integration of the Continent in the years following World War II, as it was the 
conditions that existed following this war that actually led to the integration of Europe. 
 The historical record also clearly demonstrates that the United States played an 
invaluable role in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community. In addition to 
laying the foundation for European integration through the creation of the Organization 
for European Economic Cooperation, the Americans provided the French Foreign 
Ministry with the concepts that ended up defining the Schuman Plan and the ECSC. 
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Further, it is clear that the French were very worried about the possibility of future 
German aggression in the years after World War II, meaning they would not be able to 
embrace the creation of a fully reindustrialized West Germany that was no longer 
occupied by the Allied powers without being able to count on the United States for 
assistance if the Germans should attempt to initiate a conflict with them again. Robust 
German coal and steel industries were necessary for the successful implementation of the 
Schuman Plan, however, meaning the fact that the Truman administration was willing to 
entangle itself in Continental security via the creation of NATO was a critical facilitating 
factor for the ECSC. While Rosato is correct in stating that the security guarantee against 
future German aggression that the Americans gave the French through the creation of 
NATO did not motivate European integration,
288
 it was integral in paving the way for the 
French to propose the unification of the Continent. Without American encouragement of 
and support for European integration in the postwar world, then, the unification of 
Western Europe probably never would have happened. Finally, the actions of the 
Eisenhower administration, including the dispatch of an American ambassador to the 
ECSC, the conferral of a sizeable loan to the ECSC, and the placement of short-term 
European interests over the interests of the United States, played an essential part in 
seeing to it that the European Coal and Steel Community was able to successfully 
establish itself and become a permanent part of the European landscape. 
 In sum, since the historical record does not support Rosato’s arguments regarding 
either the origins of the European Coal and Steel Community or the role played by the 
United States in the creation of that community, it follows logically that it also does not 
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support his predictions regarding the future of Europe. Indeed, contrary to what Rosato 
believes, the end of the Soviet Union has not created a situation in which the Europeans 
“have no compelling reason to preserve their economic community.”289 Instead, since the 
existence of the USSR was clearly not the driving factor in the Europeans’ decision to 
pursue integration, the current nonexistence of the USSR ought to have little effect on 
whether the European Union is sustained, deepened, or allowed to fall by the wayside. 
Since France and West Germany were seeking to achieve largely state-centric goals 
through the creation of the ECSC, it should not be assumed that, if these or other states 
decide to take actions that they perceive to be in their best interests but not necessarily in 
the best interest of the EU has a whole, they are doing so simply because the Soviet threat 
is gone and they feel no need to sustain the European Union.
290
  
 Rather, such behavior ought to be viewed as nothing more than a continuation of 
the state-centric, national interests-driven mindsets that were held by France and West 
Germany when they set up the ECSC. If EU member states’ malfeasance is seen in this 
light, it becomes clear that the future of the European Union will be decided by whether 
or not the various members of the EU believe that continued participation in the EU will 
allow them to achieve their respective states’ current goals. These states’ relationships 
with one another are also likely to continue to play an important part in determining the 
future of European unification, as the relationship between France and West Germany in 
the postwar world had a substantial impact on those states’ desires to pursue the 
integration of the Continent in the first place. A remarkable degree of continuity can, 
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therefore, be readily identified between the earliest years of Continental integration and 
the current situation in Europe, with states seeking their own national interest and the 
relationship between France and Germany – the most critical states in Western Europe 
both then and now – taking center stage.  
 Such ideas find support even among other realists, with Stanley Hoffmann serving 
as an example. In his seminal article on Western European integration, “Obstinate or 
Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe,” he puts forth 
the ideas that, in the postwar era, “Germany accepted dependence on the U.S. not merely 
as a comfort, but as a necessity as vital as breathing,” and that the “recovery of equality 
was…[a] vital goal [for the Germans].”291 Further, Hoffmann contends that the French 
still deeply feared Germany as the drive toward integration got started,
292
 and that the 
earliest forms of Continental integration worked because each state wanted to maximize 
its wealth.
293
 While he may put too much emphasis on the Soviet threat as a motivation 
for West Germany to pursue integration, Hoffmann nonetheless recognizes the 
importance of each state’s “different pulls and different pasts.” 294  Each state had its own  
reasons for pursuing the integration of Western Europe, and each wanted to integrate with 
the other member states of the ECSC on terms that it found to be pleasing and 
appropriate
295
 and which would afford it the maximum benefit. 
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 Hoffmann also holds that, despite integration, the state remains the highest 
possessor of power, and that the power of institutions such as those created in Europe is 
“limited, conditional, dependent, and reversible.”296 Ultimately, the direction of an 
integrated Europe is decided by the individual states involved in its creation.
297
 
Therefore, it should not be assumed, as Rosato has done, that a lack of total political and 
military integration on the Continent in the wake of the Cold War indicates that the 
Europeans sought to integrate in order to counter the Soviet threat and that the removal of 
this threat is the reason why these types of integration have not been forthcoming.
298
 
Instead, in the words of Hoffmann,  
 the common organs set up by the national governments, when they try to act as a 
 European executive and parliament, they are both condemned to operate in the 
 fog maintained around them by the governments….Europe cannot be what some 
 of nations have been: a people that creates its state; nor can it be what some of the 
 oldest states are and many of the new ones aspire to be: a people created by the 
 state. It has to wait until the separate states decide that their peoples are close 
 enough to justify the setting up of a European state whose task will be the welding 
 of the many into one.
299
 
Clearly, realists such as Hoffmann believe that the state has been and will continue to be 
the most important actor in Europe despite the Continent’s integration. This is a trend that 
has continued uninterrupted since the genesis of the ECSC. Both the respective 
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motivations and perceptions of national interest that are held by each state matter a great 
deal, and external factors such as the presence or absence of the Soviet Union do play a 
determining role in whether deeper integration is embraced or eschewed.  
 While the European debt crisis has been a remarkably trying time for the 
European Union and its member states, the drive toward further integration that it appears 
to have sparked provides further support for the notion that the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union has not determined the future course of European unification. This movement 
toward further integration includes not only binding new rules on taxation and spending, 
but also automatic penalties for states that overspend.
300
 In addition, European Union 
finance ministers have agreed to give the EU the power to scrutinize the eurozone 
members’ budgets before they have been approved by national parliaments, giving the 
EU a chance to make recommendations about national tax and spending policies.
301
 A 
€700 billion firewall has also recently been agreed upon, with €500 billion being set aside 
for the new European Stability Mechanism and the rest coming from the existing 
European Financial Stability Facility.
302
 Finally, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has 
expressed a vision of a Europe that features a much more federal structure, with the EU’s 
European Commission coming to function more like the Continent’s central 
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government.
303
 These developments are clear evidence of a drive toward further 
European integration, making it plain that the financial crisis has led to deeper integration 
of the Continent rather than the undoing of the great strides that have been made since the 
creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, as Rosato predicts. Again, rather 
than the existence or non-existence of the Soviet Union, the critical determining factor for 
the future of the European Union will be whether or not the individual member states of 
the EU continue to believe that membership in this organization serves the national 
interests of their respective states. If they continue to see EU membership as beneficial, 
then the world will likely be given the opportunity to witness the strengthening of 
Europe’s most important – and the world’s most advanced – regional institution, an 
institution that grew directly out of the rubble of World War II. If, however, the 
Europeans do decide at some point to put an end to their experiment in Continental 
unification, it will be because the most important EU member states – including, 
critically, modern-day France and Germany – see such a course of action as being in their 
respective states’ best interests, and not because the Soviet Union has ceased to exist.  
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